SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR

Prepared for:

The UCAlug OpenADR Task Force, UCAlug SG Security Working Group & OpenADR Alliance

Prepared by:

The UCAlug OpenADR Task Force and SG Security Joint Task Force

Managed by: UCAlug OpenADR Task Force



Version 0.02

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	i
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	•

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Open Editorial Items and Issues Log

As open items and issues are addressed in new versions of this document, they are removed from this list.

Item No.	Date	Provided By	Summary of the Issue	Status / Disposition

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	ii
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	••

Executive Summary

This document presents the security profile for Open Automated Demand Response (OpenADR). The Security Profile identifies best practices for securing OpenADR functions in a smart grid environment.

This document defines a reference architecture, a set of use cases to define system functionality, and a set of security controls for systems and components that implement the use cases. The security controls in this document are inspired by and intended to cover the application of technical requirements found in *NIST Interagency Report (IR) 7628: Guidelines for Smart Grid Cyber Security* to OpenADR systems and technology. The underlying approach behind this document was therefore to (1) summarize OpenADR interactions based on the latest OpenADR 2.0 Specification, (2) define the function of these systems by presenting a reference architecture that defines abstract roles and use cases, (3) map the use cases and roles to real-world OpenADR systems, (4) define broad security objectives for OpenADR systems, (5) identify potential failures for each role in the context of the use cases, (6) define security controls to address the failures, and (7) assign controls to the roles.

The primary audience for this document is organizations that are developing or implementing solutions requiring or providing OpenADR functionality. This document is written for system owners, system implementers, and security engineers with at least a year of experience in securing electric utility field operations.

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	iii
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	

Table of Contents

IN	ITRODUCT	ION	10
	1.1 9	ССОРЕ	
	1.1.1	Explicit Exclusions	
		Approach	
	1.3	Audience & Recommended Use	
	1.3.1	Electric Utility and Demand Response Aggregators	
	1.3.2	OpenADR Vendors	
2	FUNCT	IONAL ANALYSIS	16
	2.1	OGICAL ARCHITECTURE	
	2.2	ROLE DEFINITIONS	
	2.2.1	Demand Response (DR) Controlling Entity	
	2.2.2	Demand Response (DR) Resource	
	2.2.3	Demand Response (DR) Asset	
		ROLE MAPPINGS	
		Jse Cases	
		se 1: Demand Response Resource Registers with a Demand Response Controlling	-
		ise 2: DR Controlling Entity Notifies DR Resource of DR Event (Point-to-point Push)	
		ise 3: DR Controlling Entity Notifies DR Resource of DR Event – (Broadcast)	
		ise 4: DR Resource Requests New DR Event from DR Controlling Entity (Point-to-po	
		ise 5: DR Resource Requests New DR Event from DR Controlling Entity (Anonymou ise 6: DR Controlling Entity Schedules DR Resource for Periodic Feedback (Point-to	-
	(Point∙ Use Co	ise 7: DR Resource Notifies DR Controlling Entity of Event Performance with Feedb to-point Pull) ise 8: DR Resource Notifies DR Controlling Entity of Event Performance with Feedb to-point Push)	ack Self-Scheduled
3	FAILU	RE ANALYSIS	40
	3.1	FAILURE ANALYSIS PROCESS	
	3.2	SECURITY AND OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES	
	3.2.1	Contextual Assumptions	
	3.2.2	Security Principles	
	3.3 I	AILURES	
4	SECUR	ITY CONTROLS	50
	4.1	SCOPE OF SECURITY CONTROLS	
	4.2	CONTROL DEFINITIONS	
	4.2.1	Access Control	
	4.2.2	Audit and Accountability	
	4.2.3	Configuration Management	
	4.2.4	Continuity of Operation	
	4.2.5	Identification & Authentication	
	4.2.6	Physical & Environment Security	
	4.2.7	System & Communications Protection	
	4.2.8	System & Information Integrity	
SECURITY F	PROFILE FC	R OPENADR	Version — 0.02
UCA Internat	ional Users	Group	December 15, 2011

4.2.9	Controls Mapped to Roles	
APPENDIX A:	RELATION TO THE NIST INTERAGENCY REPORT 7628	65
A.1 Tr	ACEABILITY	65
A.2 N	ST IR 7628 Actors to WAMPAC Roles Mapping	
A.3 N	ST IR 7628 SECURITY OBJECTIVES TO OPEN ADR SECURITY PRINCIPLES MAPPING	
A.4 N	ST IR 7628 TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS MAPPED OPEN ADR CONTROLS	69
APPENDIX B:	USE CASE NOTATION GUIDE	78
APPENDIX C:	USING THE SECURITY PROFILE TO EVALUATE AN OPENADR DEPLOYMENT	80
APPENDIX D:	GLOSSARY AND ACRONYMS	82
APPENDIX E:	REFERENCES	90
APPENDIX F:	OPENADR CRYPTOGRAPHIC SECURITY PROFILE	93
	OPENADR CRYPTOGRAPHIC SECURITY PROFILE	
F.1 M		
F.1 M F.2 Re	ETHOD	93 94
F.1 M F.2 R F.3 H	ETHOD	
F.1 M F.2 Re F.3 H/ CONSIDERAT RECOMMENT	ETHOD FERENCES ISH ONS IATION	93 94 95 95 95 95
F.1 M F.2 Re F.3 H/ CONSIDERAT RECOMMENT	ETHOD FERENCES ISH ONS	93 94 95 95 95 95
F.1 M F.2 RE F.3 H, CONSIDERAT RECOMMENT F.4 SY	ETHOD FERENCES ISH ONS IATION	93 94 95 95 95 95 95 95
F.1 M F.2 Re F.3 H/ CONSIDERAT RECOMMENT F.4 SY CONSIDERAT RECOMMENT	ETHOD FERENCES ISH ONS MATION MMETRIC ENCRYPTION ONS MATION	93 94 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95
F.1 M F.2 Re F.3 H/ Considerat Recomment F.4 Sy Considerat Recomment F.5 Pu	ETHOD FERENCES ISH ONS INATION MMETRIC ENCRYPTION ONS INATION BLIC KEY/DIGITAL SIGNATURE	93 94 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95
F.1 M F.2 Re F.3 H, Considerat Recomment F.4 Sy Considerat Recomment F.5 Pu Considerat	ETHOD FERENCES	93 94 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 96 96
F.1 M F.2 Re F.3 H, Considerat Recomment F.4 Sy Considerat Recomment F.5 Pu Considerat Recomment	ETHOD FERENCES ISH ONS INATION MMETRIC ENCRYPTION ONS INATION BLIC KEY/DIGITAL SIGNATURE	93 94 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 96 96 96

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	v
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	•

Table of Figures

FIGURE 1 - OVERVIEW OF SECURITY PROFILE DEVELOPMENT APPROACH	12
FIGURE 3 – ARTIFACT RELATIONSHIPS	14
FIGURE 4 – ROLE INTERACTION DIAGRAM	17
FIGURE 5 – DR EVENT ACTIVITY DIAGRAM	18
FIGURE 6 - ROLE MAPPING	21
FIGURE 7 – SECURITY PROFILE WORKFLOW NIST-IR 7628 MAPPING	66
FIGURE 8 – UNIFIED LOGICAL ARCHITECTURE FOR OPENADR	67
Figure 9 – An Annotated Sequence Diagram	79

Diagram: Use Case 1: Register DR Resource	. 25
Diagram: Use Case 2: DR Event Notification	. 27
Diagram: Use Case 3: DR Event Notification – Broadcast	
Diagram: Use Case 4: DR Resource Requests DR Controlling Entity for New DR Event	. 31
Diagram: Use Case 5: Anonymous DR Resource Requests DR Controlling Entity for New DR Event	. 33
Diagram: Use Case 6: DR Controlling Entity Schedules DR Resource for Periodic Feedback	. 35
Diagram: Use Case 7: DR Resource Notifies DR Controlling Entity of Event Performance (Feedback)	. 37
Diagram: Use Case 8: DR Resource Notifies DR Controlling Entity of Event Performance with Feedback Self-	
Scheduled	. 39

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	vi
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	••

Table of Tables

TABLE 1 – CONTROLS: ACCESS CONTROL	53
TABLE 2 – CONTROLS: AUDIT AND ACCOUNTABILITY	54
TABLE 3 - CONTROLS: CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT	55
TABLE 4 - CONTROLS: CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS	56
TABLE 5 - CONTROLS: IDENTIFICATION & AUTHENTICATION	57
TABLE 6 - CONTROLS PHYSICAL & ENVIRONMENT SECURITY	58
TABLE 7 - CONTROLS: SYSTEM & COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION	58
TABLE 8 - CONTROLS: SYSTEM & INFORMATION INTEGRITY	60
TABLE 9 - CONTROLS MAPPED TO ROLES	61
TABLE 10 – NIST IR 7628 ACTOR TO WAMPAC ROLE MAPPING	68
TABLE 11 - NIST IR 7628 USE CASE OBJECTIVES TO OPENADR SECURITY PRINCIPLES	68
TABLE 12 - NIST IR 7628 TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS MAPPED TO OPENADR CONTROLS	69

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	vii
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	• • •

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	viii
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	• • • •

Authors

Bruce Bartell Darren Highfill Ed Koch Phillip Lee Tom Markham

Edited by: Bruce Bartell

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	ix
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	

1 Introduction

2 This document presents the security profile for Open Automatic Demand Response

3 (OpenADR). System functions considered for OpenADR which includes standardized

4 dispatch, control and pricing signals for Demand Response (DR) and Distributed

5 Generation (DG) and related messages for monitoring the status and capabilities of the

6 participating resources. The recommendations made herein are based on stated system

7 architectural and functional assumptions, and offer a singular security baseline for overall

8 use of OpenADR with tailored subsets of recommendations where variations in system

9 deployment or usage occur.

10 This document defines a Reference Architecture, a set of use cases to define system

11 functionality, and a set of security controls for systems and components that implement

12 the use cases. The security controls in this document are inspired by and intended to

13 cover the application of technical requirements found in NIST Interagency Report (IR)

14 7628: Guidelines for Smart Grid Cyber Security¹ to OpenADR systems and technology.

15 While NIST IR 7628 serves as an industry-wide reference that a utility or other

16 OpenADR participants may use as a starting point to identify intersystem-level security

17 requirements, this document provides the next level of detail by specifically addressing

18 the use of OpenADR Signals and defining security controls. The controls presented

19 herein may then, in turn, be satisfied by communications protocol definition-level

20 standards and manufacturing specifications. The underlying approach for developing this

21 document was (1) to draw on existing and developing OpenADR Standards and

¹ National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Guidelines for Smart Grid Cyber Security, NIST Interagency Report 7628, August 2010. Available at: <u>http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsNISTIRs.html</u>.

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	10
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	

- 22 implementations, (2) define the function of these systems by presenting a reference
- architecture that defines abstract roles and use cases, (3) map the architecture's roles to
- 24 OpenADR interactions, (4) define broad security objectives for OpenADR systems, (5)
- 25 identify potential failures for each role in the context of the use cases, (6) define security
- controls to address the failures, and (7) assign controls to the roles.

27 Demand Response is defined as the temporary modification of customer energy usage for

- a defined duration which is triggered by some condition on the grid such as reliability or
- 29 market conditions. These DR events result in the exchange of "DR signals" between
- service providers such as Utilities, Independent System Operators (ISO's), Aggregators,
 Energy Service Providers (ESP's), etc. and their customers. The information in the DR
- 31 Energy Service Providers (ESP's), etc. and their customers. The information in the DR 32 signals causes modifications to the end users load profiles. The temporary modifications
- 32 signals causes incurrentiations to the end users load profiles. The temporary mounteations
 33 to energy usage happen during "DR Events" when participants are called to perform
- 34 according to the terms defined as part of enrollment in a DR Program.
- 35 An understanding of the concept of roles is essential to applying the security controls
- 36 defined in this document. Roles have been designed abstractly to ensure applicability
- 37 across a range of OpenADR deployment in different markets and with different actors
- 38 with similar responsibilities. The parties are actors that can assume different roles
- 39 depending on the type of interaction. The key roles for this document are Demand
- 40 Response (DR) Controlling Entity, Demand Response (DR) Resource and Demand
- 41 Response (DR) Asset. A DR Controlling Entity sends signals to DR Resources during
- 42 DR Events in order to influence demand behavior. The roles and interactions mentioned
- 43 above are elaborated in Section 2.
- 44 It is important to note that a single actor may implement multiple roles and that a role can
- 45 be assumed by multiple actors. Moreover, each role may be implemented in different
- 46 ways, using different technologies, and by different vendors. By assigning security
- 47 controls to the abstract roles, no bias is expressed in any of these dimensions. This
- 48 document addresses security concerns by requiring that products implementing the
- 49 functionality of a given role satisfy all security controls associated with that role. If a
- 50 product implements the functionality of multiple roles, it must implement all of the
- 51 security controls associated with each of the roles.

52 **1.1 Scope**

- 53 This security profile addresses the security of functions involved in the deployment of
- 54 OpenADR. The focus is on those aspects of DR management that is required to facilitate 55 the exchange of DR signals between parties.
- 56 The types of DR interactions in scope are:
- 57 Direct Load Control Signals
- 58 Dispatching of Load Profiles
- 59 DR Related Pricing Signals
- 60 DR Resource Registration

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR

- 61 Response and Feedback from DR Resources for DR Signals
- 62 This document also recognizes that some organizations will only implement a subset of
- 63 the functions defined herein, and is therefore designed to accommodate different
- 64 configurations and choices.


65 1.1.1 Explicit Exclusions


- 66 Interactions to support many of the administrative aspects of managing a DR program
- 67 such as Enrollment, Measurement and Verification (M&V), and Settlement are not in
- 68 scope. The information and processes required for the Enrollment are still largely manual
- and vary depending on the participants and market structure. M&V and Settlement
- 70 standards are defined elsewhere by Standards Setting Organizations such as NAESB and
- 71 The IEC. The economic incentives used in DR Programs are supported by these
- 72 settlement standards.

73 1.2 Approach

77 78

- 74 The procedure used to develop this security profile is shown in Figure 1 Overview of
- 75 Security Profile Development Approach. This procedure has five steps and, as illustrated
- 76 below, these steps are not necessarily sequential and may in fact be iterative in nature.





79 Steps 1 and 2, which are chiefly concerned with defining the scope of the profile, are 80 repeated several times as the development team works with stakeholders to understand 81 their needs. Steps 3 and 4 define the purpose of security in the system's operation and 82 how security is realized. Steps 2 and 4 join in the final phases of the profile's 83 development when the development team checks that the set of selected controls is 84 complete and relevant. Step 5, which is concerned with validating the convergence of 85 previous steps, proceeds in parallel with steps 3 and 4. The tasks within each step are summarized below:² 86

- 87 1. Define the scope of the security profile. The first step is to decide what aspects of 88 the system are to be included in the security profile. This step requires discussion 89 with stakeholders, consideration of existing and planned systems that will fall 90 within the scope of the profile, and the construction of a conceptual model of 91 those systems that refines and clarifies the statement of scope. The conceptual 92 model includes use cases that define what uses of the system are addressed by the 93 security profile and identifies the roles within those use cases that are the targets of the security guidance to be developed. 94
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- 1013. Identify security influences and objectives. The specific aims of the security102profile are defined here in terms of the logical architecture from step 2. These103aims include high-level security guidance that the profile will refine, related104security guidance that will be tailored for the security profile, and characteristics105of the system that must be preserved as security controls are put into place. This106step also includes identification of security related failures that may inhibit the107operation of the system.
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 4. Define the security controls. New security controls are defined, existing controls
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- *Validation.* This step encompasses a collection of validation checks, such as
 ensuring that the selected controls are complete with respect to the identified
 failures (i.e., that there is at least one control for each failure) and that there are no
 superfluous controls (i.e., for each recommended control, there is a failure that it
 addresses).
- 117 The products of these steps are shown in Figure 2.

² For a more detailed description of this process, please see the ASAP-SG Security Profile Blueprint. http://www.smartgridipedia.org/images/4/43/Security_Profile_Blueprint_-v1_0_- 20101006.pdf




Figure 2 – Artifact Relationships

120 The individual use case steps within each use case provide a detailed view of the

121 activities that are considered within the scope of the profile. Each step is carried out by a

specific role, and that role is responsible for the security controls that mitigate potential

123 failures of the step. These potential failures are identified in step 3 above by considering

124 of how each step in these use cases may fail and, consequently, how the failure might

prevent the system or role from successfully carrying out the use case. Each identified

126 potential failure of a step in a use case prompts the development of one or more controls

127 to mitigate it.

128 Though most controls are assigned to specific roles, some failures span two or more roles

- and therefore imply a failure of the communication network that is used by the roles to
- 130 coordinate their actions. These failures are mitigated by network controls that focus
- 131 specifically on protecting the movement of information within the use case. These
- 132 controls take the form of recommended network segmentation (see Section 4.1).
- 133 Whenever a control is derived from sources identified in step 4, that source (e.g.,
- reference to a specific NIST IR 7628 requirement number) is noted.

135 **1.3 Audience & Recommended Use**

136 The primary audience of this document is organizations that are developing or

137 implementing solutions requiring or providing OpenADR functionality. This document is

138 written for system owners, system implementers, and security engineers with at least a

139 year of experience in securing electric utility field operations. The user is assumed to be

- 140 experienced at information asset risk estimation. The user is further assumed to be
- 141 knowledgeable in applying security requirements and guidance. The user will ultimately

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	14	
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011		

- 142 leverage this profile by reference as the specific set of security controls that must be
- 143 implemented by OpenADR components and systems, above and beyond organizational-
- 144 level requirements as specified in the NIST IR 7628 and other recommended best
- 145 practice documents for cyber security as listed in Section 4.2 and Appendix
- 146 E:References.
- 147 Additional sections below discuss how the document should be used by various
- stakeholders. The profile development approach (summarized in Section 1.2) guides the
- reader through the process used in this document for determining controls required for
- 150 given failures (impacts) for roles and the functionality they implement (use cases),
- 151 thereby providing traceability and justification for each of the controls selected.

152 **1.3.1 Electric Utility and Demand Response Aggregators**

- An electric utility may use this document to help achieve multiple security objectives fortheir organization through activities such as:
- developing security requirements for OpenADR technology procurement activities
- 157 2. configuring and operating OpenADR systems
- evaluating planned or deployed OpenADR solutions (see Appendix C: for more information)
- 160 In some cases, a utility will not make use of all functionality described in the included use cases, which may obviate the requirements for certain controls. The tables within the 161 162 document can be used to determine security controls needed for a utility's environment 163 and provide traceability and justification for the design requirements and control 164 selection. In other cases, an organization may identify an alternative (mitigating) control 165 that makes a required control unnecessary, but the utility should be sure it addresses all 166 the same failures and should perform a risk analysis to confirm the adequacy of the 167 alternative control.

168 1.3.2 OpenADR Vendors

- 169 Vendors may use this document to incorporate security controls needed for the
- 170 development of OpenADR products as well as solutions built upon or derived from
- 171 OpenADR technology. This document provides enough requirement detail to allow a
- 172 vendor to begin design activities, but avoids prescription that would thwart innovation or
- 173 drive toward specific implementations. The reference architecture and use cases also
- 174 offer tools for understanding OpenADR applications in an abstract sense.

175

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	15
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	

26 Functional Analysis

177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185	The purpose of the functional analysis is to define a clear picture of the scope, architecture, and functionality of Open Automated Demand Control (OpenADR) systems, as addressed by this security profile. The implementation of OpenADR system functions varies in terms of function, scope, and technology from among different market and system offerings and deployments. However, this profile approaches the problem by defining a set of abstract roles that capture essential functionality that may be realized through a variety of implementations. This profile defines roles in such a way that the logical architecture and use case functionality may be used to represent a wide variety of real-world implementations.
186	By way of background, the following steps were performed in the functional analysis:
187 188	1. Review of the existing documents that define the overall OpenADR process, paradigm, and design (as defined in Appendix E References).
189 190 191 192 193	2. Define abstract roles that characterize elements of OpenADR Systems. Roles are neutral to implementation and vendor, and capture the essence of common functionality without the details of particular applications. The resulting roles are presented in Section 2. Their relationships with each other (topologically) are presented in Section 2.1.
194 195 196 197 198 199	3. Define use cases describing how the roles interact to implement OpenADR functionality. The use cases are modular in nature, which allows organizations to determine which use cases are relevant to their deployments. They also capture raw functionality, without the inclusion of security controls, which ensures that no pre-existing security controls are assumed and allows different controls to be applied without bias. The resulting use cases are presented in Section 2.4.

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	16
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	

- 4. Validate the roles and use cases by ensuring that they are adequate to describe
 common real-world implementations. The mapping between roles and real world
 implementations are presented in Section 2.3 (this is presented before the use
 cases to reinforce the meaning of the roles).
- 204 The security recommendations found in this document are defined in terms of the logical
- architecture and its constituent roles, both of which are defined in this section. The
- 206 logical architecture includes some elements that are outside the scope of this profile;
- 207 however, each of these elements is important within the context of OpenADR and so are
- 208 included as context.

209 2.1 Logical Architecture

- 210 The roles defined in this profile are *abstract* or *logical* roles; that is, each role does not
- 211 necessarily map one-to-one with an actor, device, or system. It is possible for an actor to
- 212 implement the functionality of multiple roles. However, it is also possible for the
- 213 functionality of one role to be implemented by multiple actors. This document focuses on
- 214 defining the roles, their functionality, and ultimately the security controls each role must
- 215 implement at this abstract level and leaves the task of mapping roles to specific actors,
- 216 devices, or systems to those developing or procuring these elements.





Figure 3 – Role Interaction Diagram

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	17
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	• •

- 220 The essential roles involved in OpenADR are shown in Figure 3 Role Interaction
- 221 Diagram. This diagram represents the roles (defined in Section 2.2) as rounded
- rectangles. Rectangles that include other rectangles indicate that a role is a composition
- or aggregation of other roles. For example, a DR Resource is comprised of multiple
- assets. A rectangle with multiple roles indicates that a single actor can act in multiple
- roles in the OpenADR process. For example, the same actor can be a DR Resource for on
- set of interactions, and a DR Controlling Entity for another set of interactions.



229

Figure 4 – DR Event Activity Diagram

- A high level Activity Diagram of the OpenADR Event process is shown in Figure 4 DR Event Activity Diagram
- 231 Event Activity Diagram.
- The detailed steps of all OpenADR processes in scope are defined in detailed Use Cases in Section 2.4. The major steps are outlined as:
- A DR Resource communicates capabilities, constraints, status and performance characteristics to a DR Controlling Entity.(Register DR Resource)
- 236 2. A DR Controlling Entity decides to call an event (based on grid conditions)
- 237 Determine what objectives to meet during the Event schedule
- 238 3. Execution of the Event
- Determine which DR Resources and participation schedules to apply to
 meet those objectives
- 241 Send Signal(s) to the DR Resources
- o Monitor what is going on (Feedback from DR Resources)

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	18
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	10

- 243 4. Evaluation of what happened (out of scope for OpenADR)
- 244 Measurement and & Verification
- 245 o Reconciliation (Billing)
- 246
- All roles are assumed to have some inherent communications ability (i.e., there is no need to model a distinct communications element associated with each role).
- 249

251 **2.2 Role Definitions**

All roles are defined in the following sub-sections.

253 2.2.1 Demand Response (DR) Controlling Entity

254 The Demand Response Controlling Entity role represents all of the different entities that 255 may need to manage and interact with wholesale and/or retail DR resources and includes 256 the following actors: Independent System Operator / Regional Transmission Operator (ISO/RTO), Distribution Company, Load Serving Entity, DR Aggregator and others. 257 Different actors may function as the DR Controlling Entity at different points in the 258 259 process of administering a DR Event. The DR Controlling Entity may represent a single actor, such as a Utility Distribution Company (UDC) in the business role of a Load 260 261 Serving Entity.

- A DR Controlling Entity may represent a hierarchy of entities such as the followingexample:
- An ISO/RTO dispatches DR instructions to a Transmission Operator.
- The Transmission Operator in turn assumes the DR Controlling entity role by sending the dispatch instructions on to a UDC.
- The UDC in turn assumes the DR Controlling Entity Role by sending instructions to a DR Aggregator.
- The DR Aggregator then assumes the DR Controlling Entity role by directing a specific DR Resource to execute the instruction.
- This can be modeled as a recursive relationship with a DR Controlling Entity which
 represents each of these actors in an integration role. The goal is to minimize the number
- of different logical components and hence the number of different services and message
- payloads that need to be defined through reuse of the standard services and payloaddefinitions.

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	19
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	

This concept is elaborated more extensively in an EPRI report titled *Concepts to Enable Advancement of Distributed Energy Resources.*³ The terminology for the interaction parties varies depending on the source^{4 5}. For the purposes of this analysis, the roles and definitions used are those defined in "OpenADR 1.0 System Requirements Specification v1.0" developed by the OpenSG OpenADR Task Force.

281 2.2.2 Demand Response (DR) Resource

A DR resource is a virtual representation of one or more assets or physical devices capable of shedding or managing load in response to a triggering event. A DR Resource may consist of multiple assets or devices that have been aggregated to form a larger load shedding capacity or energy resource.

As in the examples for a DR Controlling Entity, many of the same actors are also a DR Resource:

- An ISO/RTO dispatches DR instructions to a Transmission Operator. The Transmission Operator
 a DR Resource of the ISO/RTO.
- The Transmission Operator in turn assumes the DR Controlling entity role by sending the dispatch instructions on to a UDC. The UDC is a DR Resource of the Transmission Operator.
- The UDC in turn assumes the DR Controlling Entity Role by sending instructions to a DR
 Aggregator. The DR Aggregator is a DR Resource of the UDC.
- The DR Aggregator then assumes the DR Controlling Entity role by directing a specific DR
 Resource to execute the instruction. The DR Resource in this example could be a manufacturing
 facility. The facility has multiple types of machinery that is one large DR Resource composed of
 the aggregated the total load shedding capacity of all the assets or devices in the plant. A DR
 Resource may also consist of different types of generation assets such as a wind Turbine, battery,
 and an electric motor that work in combination to meet DR program obligations.

299 2.2.3 Demand Response (DR) Asset

300 A DR Asset is an end device that is capable of shedding or managing load in response to

- 301 Demand Response Events, Energy or Ancillary Services, Price Signals or other system
- 302 events (e.g. under frequency detection). The DR Asset can be controlled by an end device
- 303 control through Direct Load Control or Demand Response Load Control.

⁵ For the purposes of use case interactions defined in this document the role DR Controlling Entity is equivalent to Resource Energy Controller (REC) as used in 3 and Virtual Top Node (VTN) as used in 4. The role of DR Resource is equivalent to the role of Virtual End Node as used by 3 and 4.

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	20
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	20

³ Concepts to Enable Advancement of Distributed Energy Resources: White Paper on DER. EPRI, Palo Alto, CA : 2010. 1020432


⁴ The document referenced by 3 is also referenced by **[ENERGYINTEROP-v1.0]** *Energy Interoperation Version 1.0.* OASIS Committee Specification Draft 02 / Public Review Draft 02. 15 July 2011. http://docs.oasis-open.org/energyinterop/ei/v1.0/csprd02/energyinterop-v1.0-csprd02.html

304 2.3 Role Mappings

305 The logical architecture presented in the previous section can be realized in different deployment settings. For example, The DR Controlling Entity that initiates a DR Event 306 307 can be a Market Operator, Independent System Operator (ISO), or a Utility depending on 308 location and market structure. The DR Resource that participates in the event under the 309 direction of a DR Controlling Entity could be a Utility, DR Aggregator, or any resource 310 at a customer location. At each level of interaction a DR Resource that receives a DR 311 Signal from a DR Controlling Entity can in turn act as a DR Controlling Entity to direct 312 other DR Resources. An example of one possible mapping to a single implementation 313 scenario is provided in Figure 3.

314

315 316 317



318 **2.4 Use Cases**

319 This section is a subset of all the interactions needed to implement OpenADR as a system

320 based on the scope defined in Section 2.1.

321 This Security Profile defines OpenADR functionality using the following use cases:

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	21
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	

322 323 324	DR C	ase 1 deals with the interactions initiated by a DR Resource to provide the ontrolling Entity with information on the capabilities and constraints of a esource to participate in DR Events. These include:
325 326	0	Notice of capabilities and constraints and subsequent changes these capabilities and constraints.
327 328	0	Notice of scheduling constraints based on temporary changes to availability
329 330 331 332 333 334	manag used b throug the pu	ases 2-5 deal with the interactions used by a DR Controlling Entity to ge the DR Resources during the execution of a DR Event. The DR Signals by a DR Controlling Entity can influence the behavior of a DR Resource gh the use of signal types for Objectives, Price, and Direct Load Control. For irposes of failure analysis the use cases are broken out based on the ction pattern ⁶ :
335 336 337 338	0	Point to Point Push – Point to Point Push is an interaction initiated by the producer or creator of the message. This pattern assumes that the communications is point to point and between entities that are aware of each others identity.
339 340 341 342	0	Point to Point Pull – Point to Point Pull is an interaction initiated by the message consumer. It requires that a callback can be associated with a request. This pattern assumes that the communications is point to point and between entities that are aware of each others identity.
343 344 345 346	0	Broadcast – A Broadcast is a message sent to a set of parties where the sender does not know who the recipients may be. Access to the broadcast message could be through a message board, a message broker, or other means. A Broadcast may also be considered an anonymous push.
347 348 349 350	0	Anonymous Pull – The Anonymous Pull pattern is similar to the point to point pull except that the identity of the consumer is unknown to the sender. It is also assumed that no reply from the consumer is required or expected.
351 352 353 354	Contre Point-	ases 6-8 deal with Feedback provided by a DR Resource to a DR olling Entity during the execution of a DR Event. Feedback interactions use to-point Pull and Point-to-point Push as defined above. Use Cases 7-8 are tives of Use Case 6.
355 356 357		tes do <i>not</i> include security controls, such as the use of authentication or ecurity controls and their mapping to the roles performing these use cases Section 4.

⁶ The terminology used for interaction patterns applies only to the pattern being described, and do not imply any specific routing or communication methodology.

358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365	The use cases include the depiction of "acknowledgements" in the interaction (sequence) diagrams for the purpose of completeness in the representation. Acknowledgements are considered a separate security control and are not included in the use case summary or addressed individually in context of a use case step. A "reply" to a message contains other information other than a simple acknowledgement that a message has been received (e.g. notice of non-performance, failure information, etc.). Reply messages are included are included in the use case analysis as security controls may vary by context. Each use case contains the following elements:
366	 Use Case Description: This is a summary of the use case, describing the overall
367	flow and steps.
368 369	• Preconditions: These are conditions that must be true for the use case to be successfully executed.
370 371	• Minimal Guarantees: These are properties that must remain true any time the use case is initiated, regardless of whether it terminates successfully.
372 373 374 375	• Success Guarantees: These are properties that will be true only if the use case terminates successfully. This requires that all preconditions and all condition checks (e.g., for validity of a request) be satisfied during execution of the use case.
376	• Trigger: This is the stimulus that initiates execution of the use case.
377 378 379 380	• Main Success Scenario: This defines the series of steps undertaken by each role during successful execution of the use case. The scenario is depicted graphically in an activity diagram (the notation used in these diagrams is explained in Appendix B) and each step is summarized in text.
381	
382	

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	23
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	20

Use Case 1: Demand Response Resource Registers with a Demand 383

384 **Response Controlling Entity**

385 Use Case Description: A party with ownership, controlling interest or administrative

responsibilities for a Resource communicates operational information about the Resource 386

387 to a controlling entity. This includes information about the capabilities, availability, and

- 388 constraints regarding the Resource's ability to shed load or generate power.
- 389 The DR Resource initiates the process through a Registration Message and can
- 390 subsequently change that information or remove any availability for performance in a DR
- 391 Program using the same interaction pattern. A DR Resource can also declare itself

392 unavailable to perform in a DR Program on a temporary basis using an Opt-out.

393

394 **Preconditions:**

- 395 The DR Resource and DR Controlling Entity have all of the necessary network • 396 connections available.
- 397 • The party with ownership, controlling interest or administrative responsibilities 398 for the Resource has enrolled in a Demand Response Program that is administered 399 by the DR Controlling Entity.

400 **Minimal Guarantees:**

- 401 The DR Resource does not reveal any information to another party that would • 402 allow that party to provide any false information to a DR Controlling Entity 403 attributed to the DR Resource.
- 404 • The DR Controlling Entity does not process any invalid data.


405 **Success Guarantees:**

406 • The DR Resource has registered with the DR Controlling Entity prior to a call for 407 performance under the terms of the DR Program and provided all Resource information necessary to participate in a DR Event. 408

409 **Trigger:**

- 410 The trigger for this use case could be an operator initiated trigger or the result of a pre-
- configured device configured to participate in a DR Program. 411

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	24
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	



415 Main Success Scenario:

416 1: The DR Resource sends a registration request to create, change, or remove a profile to

- 417 the DR Controlling Entity.
- 418 2: The DR Controlling Entity receives the registration.
- 419 3: The DR Controlling Entity assesses the validity of the Resource registration request.
- 420 4: The DR Controlling Entity sends a reply based on the results of the assessment.

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	25
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	

421 Use Case 2: DR Controlling Entity Notifies DR Resource of DR Event 422 (Point-to-point Push)

Use Case Description: This interaction is used to dispatch DR Resources. The initiator
 of the interaction is the DR Controlling Entity. The initiating event message is directed to
 a specific DR Resource. The dispatch can convey an objective, price or direct load

- 425 a specific DR Resource. The dispatch can convey an objective, price or direct load426 control signal.
- The objective is expressed as a load or generation value (e.g. shed 100kW) for the load profile of the DR Resource for a specific interval or series of intervals.
- The price message expresses the price for an interval or intervals as an absolute real time price or a price relative to the current tariff price.
- The direct load control message includes an on/off or set point (e.g. set thermostat to80 degrees).
- 433 The Event Notification message can contain one or more of the three signal types.

434 **Preconditions:**

- The DR Resource and DR Controlling Entity have all of the necessary network
 connections available.
- The party with ownership, controlling interest or administrative responsibilities
 for the Resource has enrolled in a Demand Response Program that is administered
 by the DR Controlling Entity.

440 Minimal Guarantees:

- The DR Controlling Entity does not reveal any information that could allow
 another party to present false identification, or intercept or alter future messages
 sent to the DR Resource.
- The DR Resource does not process any invalid data.
- 445 Success Guarantees:
- The DR Resource receives and replies to an Event notification.

447 Trigger:

The trigger for this use case could be from multiple sources depending on the span of
control of the DR Controlling Entity and the DR Program definition. The originating
Event message could be a manual response from a Market Operator based on forecasted

- 451 or current conditions. The event could be a manual or automated response to a program
- 452 rule regarding time of day and outside air temperature, or any number of options. If the
- 453 DR Controlling Entity is a DR Aggregator, it could be a manual or automated response to
- 454 an event signal from a Market Operator.

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	26
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	20






Diagram: Use Case 2: DR Event Notification

458 Main Success Scenario:

459 1: A DR Controlling Entity sends a DR Event Notification (a.k.a DR Dispatch) to the DR

460 Resource. [A DR Event Notification could be for a new DR Event, an update or

461 cancellation of a pending or current DR Event.]

462 2: The DR Resource receives the DR Event Notification and may or may not choose to463 send an acknowledgement of receipt reply.

3: The DR Resource assesses the validity of the Event Notification and initiates actionnecessary to send a valid reply.

466 4: The DR Resource sends a reply with an affirmative acknowledgement, notice to opt467 out, or failure message.

468 5: The DR Controlling Entity receives the reply and may or may not choose to send an

469 acknowledgement of receipt reply.

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	27
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	

470 Use Case 3: DR Controlling Entity Notifies DR Resource of DR Event – 471 (Broadcast)

Use Case Description: This interaction is used to dispatch DR Resources. The initiator
of the interaction is the DR Controlling Entity. The initiating event message is directed to
multiple DR Resources. Identification of the applicable Resources could be one of

- 475 several groups such as geographic location. The dispatch can convey an objective, price476 or direct load control signal.
- The objective is expressed as a load or generation value (e.g. shed 100kW) for the load profile of the DR Resource for a specific interval or series of intervals.
- The price message expresses the price for an interval or intervals as an absolute real timeprice or a price relative to the current tariff price.
- 481 The direct load control message includes an on/off or set point (e.g. set thermostat to482 80 degrees).
- 483 The Event Notification message can contain one or more of the three signal types.
- 484

485 **Preconditions:**

486
 The DR Resource and DR Controlling Entity have all of the necessary network connections available.

488 Minimal Guarantees:

- The DR Controlling Entity does not reveal any information that could allow
 another party to present false identification, or intercept or alter future messages
 sent to the DR Resource.
- The DR Resource does not process any invalid data.


493 Success Guarantees:

- The DR Resource receives price notification and is able to respond and perform
 load-shed or generation based on the current price conditions and best economic
 interests of the DR Resource.
- 497

498 Trigger:

- 499 The trigger for this use case could be from multiple sources depending on the span of
- control of the DR Controlling Entity and the DR Program definition. It could be a manualor automated process.

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	28
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	20



504 Main Success Scenario:

- 505 1: A DR Controlling Entity broadcasts a DR Event message to multiple DR Resources.
- 506 2: The DR Resource receives the DR Event message.
- 507 3: The DR Resource initiates action to reduce load or generate power.
- 508

502 503

- 509
- 510

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	29
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	20

511 Use Case 4: DR Resource Requests New DR Event from DR Controlling 512 Entity (Point-to-point Pull)

513 Use Case Description: This interaction is used to dispatch DR Resources based on a

514 request from the DR Resource. The Event Notification message can contain one or more

- 515 of the three signal types: objective, price or direct load control message.
- 516 The objective is expressed as a load or generation value (e.g. shed 100kW) for the load 517 profile of the DR Resource for a specific interval or series of intervals.
- 518 The price message expresses the price for an interval or intervals as an absolute real time 519 price or a price relative to the current tariff price.
- 520 The direct load control message includes an on/off or set point (e.g. set thermostat to 80 degrees).

522 **Preconditions:**

- The DR Resource and DR Controlling Entity have all of the necessary network connections available.
- The party with ownership, controlling interest or administrative responsibilities
 for the Resource has enrolled in a Demand Response Program that is administered
 by the DR Controlling Entity.

528 Minimal Guarantees:

- The DR Resource does not reveal any information that would allow another party
 to present false identification or intercept messages as a DR Resource.
- The DR Controlling Entity does not process invalid requests.


532 Success Guarantees:

The DR Resource receives an Event notification and is able to respond and
 attempt to perform based on the content and intentions of the DR Event signal and
 provide feedback to the DR Controlling Entity.

536 Trigger:

- 537 The trigger for this use case is a request from the DR Resource. The request is sent based
- on the temporal aspects of the specific Demand Response Program and enrollment
- agreements between the DR Controlling Entity and DR Resource. For example, for a
- 540 day-ahead program the request is sent for the next day's event.

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	30
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	00



542 Diagram: Use Case 4: DR Resource Requests DR Controlling Entity for New DR Event

543 Main Success Scenario:

- 1: The DR Resource requests a DR Event Notification from the DR Controlling Entity.
- 545 2: The DR Controlling Entity receives a Request for a DR Event Notification.
- 546 3: The DR Controlling Entity responds with the Event Notification.
- 547 4: DR Resource receives the DR Event Notification.
- 548 5: The DR Resource assesses the validity of the Event Notification and initiates action
- 549 necessary to send a valid reply.
- 550 6: The DR Resource replies to receipt of the DR Event Notification.
- 551 7: The DR Controlling Entity receives the reply and may or may not choose to send an
- acknowledgement of receipt reply.

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	31
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	•••

553 Use Case 5: DR Resource Requests New DR Event from DR Controlling 554 Entity (Anonymous Pull)

555 Use Case Description: This interaction is used to dispatch DR Resources based on a 556 request from the DR Resource. The identity of the DR Resource is unknown to the DR

557 Controlling Entity. The Event Notification message can contain one or more of the three 558 signal types: objective, price or direct load control message.

- 559 The objective is expressed as a load or generation value (e.g. shed 100kW) for the load 560 profile of the DR Resource for a specific interval or series of intervals.
- 561 The price message expresses the price for an interval or intervals as an absolute real time 562 price or a price relative to the current tariff price.
- 563 The direct load control message includes an on/off or set point (e.g. set thermostat to 80 degrees).

565 **Preconditions:**

The DR Resource and DR Controlling Entity have all of the necessary network
 connections available.

568 Minimal Guarantees:

- The DR Resource does not reveal any information that would allow another party 570 to present false identification or intercept messages as a DR Resource.
- The DR Controlling Entity does not process invalid requests.


572 Success Guarantees:

The DR Resource receives an Event notification and is able to respond and
 perform based on the content and intentions of the DR Event signal and provide
 feedback to the DR Controlling Entity..

576 Trigger:

- 577 The trigger for this use case is a request from the DR Resource. The request is sent based
- 578 on the temporal aspects of the specific Demand Response Program and enrollment
- agreements between the DR Controlling Entity and DR Resource. For example, for a
- 580 day-ahead program the request is sent for the next day's event.

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	32
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	02





582 583

Diagram: Use Case 5: Anonymous DR Resource Requests DR Controlling Entity for New DR Event

584 Main Success Scenario:

- 1: The DR Resource requests a DR Event Notification from the DR Controlling Entity.
- 586 2: The DR Controlling Entity receives a Request for a DR Event Notification.
- 587 3: The DR Controlling Entity responds with the Event Notification.
- 588 4: DR Resource receives the DR Event Notification.
- 589

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	33
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	55

590 Use Case 6: DR Controlling Entity Schedules DR Resource for Periodic 591 Feedback (Point-to-point Push)

592 Use Case Description: This interaction is used by the DR Resource to notify the DR

- 593 Controlling Entity of the Resource's status or state of the Resource during the event. The
- feedback is provided continuously during the event in intervals agreed upon by the
- 595 parties. The performance feedback contains information such as the load profile response
- 596 characterization of the DR Resource in response to getting the DR signal and information
- about the near real time electricity usage of the DR Resource.
- 598 This use case is comprised of three interaction patterns:
- 599 o Initiate periodic feedback.
- 600 Provide periodic feedback.
- 601 Change (terminate is a type of change) feedback request.

602 **Preconditions:**

- The DR Resource and DR Controlling Entity have all of the necessary network
 connections available.
- The party with ownership, controlling interest or administrative responsibilities
 for the Resource has enrolled in a Demand Response Program that is administered
 by the DR Controlling Entity.

608 Minimal Guarantees:

- The DR Resource does not reveal any information that could allow another party
 to present false identification, or intercept or alter future messages sent to the DR
 Controlling Entity.
- The DR Controlling Entity does not process any invalid data.


613 Success Guarantees:

The DR Controlling Entity receives continuous and timely (real time or near real time) feedback from the DR Resource during the entire Event performance window.

617 **Trigger:**

- 618 The trigger for this use case is based on an agreed upon reporting interval associated with
- a DR Event. Generally, the DR Controlling Entity will initiate the feedback interactions
- 620 at the start of an Event.
- 621

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	34
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	V T





624

Diagram: Use Case 6: DR Controlling Entity Schedules DR Resource for Periodic Feedback

625 Main Success Scenario:

626 **1. Initiate or terminate periodic feedback:**

- 627 1.1: A DR Controlling Entity sends a Feedback schedule request to a DR Resource.
- 628 1.2: A DR Resource receives a Feedback schedule request from a DR Controlling Entity.
- 629 1.3: A DR Resource assesses the request and initiates action to provide a reply and630 subsequent feedback messages.
- 631 2. Provide periodic feedback
- 632 2.1: A DR Resource periodically summarizes performance status using an interval633 defined in the Feedback schedule request.
- 634 2.3: A DR Resource sends a Feedback message to a DR Controlling Entity containing the635 information assembled in the previous step.
- 636 2.4: The DR Controlling Entity Receives a Feedback message from a DR Resource.

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	35
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	

637 Use Case 7: DR Resource Notifies DR Controlling Entity of Event

638 Performance with Feedback by Request (Point-to-point Pull)

639


640 Use Case Description: This interaction is used by the DR Resource to notify the DR 641 Controlling Entity of the Resource's status or state of the Resource during the event. The 642 feedback is provided as requested by the DR Controlling Entity. The performance 643 feedback contains information such as the load profile response characterization of the 644 DR Resource in response to getting the DR signal and information about the near real 645 time electricity usage of the DR Resource. This case differs from the prior use case in 646 that the request from the DR Controlling Entity is for a single reply without a recurring 647 schedule. 648 **Preconditions:** 649 The DR Resource and DR Controlling Entity have all of the necessary network • 650 connections available. 651 The party with ownership, controlling interest or administrative responsibilities 652 for the Resource has enrolled in a Demand Response Program that is administered 653 by the DR Controlling Entity. 654 **Minimal Guarantees:** 655 The DR Resource does not reveal any information that could allow another party • to present false identification, or intercept or alter future messages sent to the DR 656 657 Controlling Entity. 658 • The DR Controlling Entity does not process any invalid data. 659 **Success Guarantees:** 660 The DR Controlling Entity receives timely (real time or near real time) feedback •

661 from the DR Resource.

662 Trigger:

- 663 The trigger for this use case is based on an agreed upon reporting interval.
- 664

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	36
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	00



666Diagram: Use Case 7: DR Resource Notifies DR Controlling Entity of Event Performance667(Feedback)

668 Main Success Scenario:

- 1: A DR Controlling Entity sends a Feedback request to a DR Resource.
- 670 2: A DR Resource receives a Feedback request from a DR Resource.
- 671 3: A DR Resource retrieves feedback information.
- 4: A DR Resource sends a Feedback message to a DR Controlling Entity.
- 5: The DR Controlling Entity Receives a Feedback message from a DR Resource.

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	37
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	01

Use Case 8: DR Resource Notifies DR Controlling Entity of Event Performance with Feedback Self-Scheduled (Point-to-point Push)

676 Use Case Description: This interaction is used by the DR Resource to notify the DR 677 Controlling Entity of the Resources status or state of the Resource during the event. The 678 feedback is provided as scheduled by the DR Resource without scheduling influences 679 from the DR Controlling Entity. The performance feedback contains information such as 680 the load profile response characterization of the DR Resource in response to getting the 681 DR signal and information about the near real time electricity usage of the DR Resource.

682 **Preconditions:**

- The DR Resource and DR Controlling Entity have all of the necessary network
 connections available.
- The party with ownership, controlling interest or administrative responsibilities
 for the Resource has enrolled in a Demand Response Program that is administered
 by the DR Controlling Entity.
- The DR Resource is a self-scheduled Resource.


689 Minimal Guarantees:

- The DR Resource does not reveal any information that could allow another party
 to present false identification, or intercept or alter future messages sent to the DR
 Controlling Entity.
- The DR Controlling Entity does not process any invalid data.

694 Success Guarantees:

- The DR Controlling Entity receives timely (real time or near real time) feedback
 from the DR Resource.
- 697 Trigger:
- 698 The trigger for this use case is based on an agreed upon reporting interval.

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	38
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	00



701Diagram: Use Case 8: DR Resource Notifies DR Controlling Entity of Event Performance702with Feedback Self-Scheduled

703 Main Success Scenario:

- 1.DR Resource accumulates Feedback information.
- 705 2 DR Resource sends Feedback to DR Controlling Entity.
- 706 3. DR Controlling Entity receives Feedback message from DR Resource.
- 707

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	39
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	00

38 Failure Analysis

- The approach used to create this security profile defines the functions of OpenADR
- 710 systems based on defined abstract roles and use cases. The development of the use cases
- and the definition of roles take into account a foundational set of security and operational
- objectives that is also used in the failure analysis. The failure analysis begins with a
- description of the process for identifying failures in Section 3.1 below. A brief overview
- of the foundational security and operational objectives is presented in Section 3.2 and a
- more detailed view of the identified failures is presented in Section 3.3.

716 3.1 Failure Analysis Process

717 The failure identification and analysis process is loosely based on conducting a Failure 718 Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) on the OpenADR logical architecture presented in 719 Section 2.1, however the analysis was performed with a security bias to failure 720 identification. A FMEA is a qualitative procedure for analyzing potential system failures 721 and their associated modes as a function of assemblies, subassemblies, components, 722 subcomponents, and so forth. This process leads to a quantification of the number and 723 severity of failures and to an understanding of their impact on system stability and 724 operations. With this information, a cost-benefits analysis can then be conducted to 725 eliminate those risks that are considered catastrophic and accept those risks that are 726 considered acceptable/manageable during operations. In general, the protocol for 727 conducting a FMEA includes:

 Establish a comprehensive understanding of the enterprise/system/process under consideration by gathering all relevant information and invoking a proper review process.

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	40
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	

731	2.	Based on (1), develop a functional hierarchy of roles and responsibilities.
732 733	3.	At an appropriate level of abstraction, identify all failures, effects, consequences, and initiating events associated with each role.
734 735	4.	Identify and analyze controls for each failure, its effects and consequences, or both.
736 737	5.	Qualitatively assign a risk for each failure pairing through a Risk Priority Number (RPN) calculation.
738 739	6.	Perform a cost-benefit evaluation for controls (with respect to risk reduction) and provide a balanced decision process for corrective action implementation.
740 741 742 743	5-6 m systen	e OpenADR security profile, the failure analysis process centers on steps 1-4. Steps ust account for the specific needs of the organization that owns or operates the n, so the outcome of these steps is necessarily specific to that organization and is vered by this profile.
744		
745 746 747 748 749	set of descri	the system elements and their roles (Section 2) and relationships (Section 2.3), the role/failure pairings are applied to a finite set of use cases (Section 2.4) to provide a ptive analysis of how the OpenADR system may fail. The resulting list of failures as a basis for (1) justifying the set of selected controls, as each control must as an identified failure, and (2) identifying and remediating gaps in the selected

- 750 controls, as each failure must be addressed by at least one control.
- 751 For this security profile, failure analysis centers on the roles and use cases defined in
- 752 Sections 2 and 2.4 and the impact of potential failures on an OpenADR system. This
- 753 process is used to identify OpenADR system issues, which are in turn used as inputs to
- 754 assign failure incidents for the pairing of each role with each step of each use case. Each
- 755 step of each use case is examined for potential failures against the security and
- 756 operational objectives with respect to each role. All of the identified failures are then
- 757 aggregated and generalized across all use cases.

3.2 Security and Operational Objectives 758

759 The goal of this document is to establish a cyber environment in which an OpenADR 760 system can successfully and securely operate. Meeting this goal requires that a number of 761 security and operational objectives that support that goal are achieved. This section 762 defines the assumptions made regarding the operational context for OpenADR systems 763 and how the systems will be operated in the context of a security analysis, and then 764 presents a set of security objectives around which the remainder of the document 765 revolves.

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	41
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	

766 3.2.1 Contextual Assumptions

This document assumes that the following conditions, largely or wholly outside of the organization's control, apply to the environment in which Open ADR systems will be deployed:

770 1. Load shedding/Generation capacity and ramp rate vary from DR Asset to 771 DR Asset. Risks associated with the compromise of each DR Asset will be 772 different depending on the compromised DR Asset's capabilities. 773 2. DR Resource/Asset's response to DR Event(s) is uncertain due to DR 774 Resource/Asset's ability to opt-out of DR Event(s) at any time. Open ADR 775 is not intended to be part of critical grid operations unless DR 776 Resource/Asset gives full commitment to accurately follow DR 777 instructions. 778 3. All participants will act to maximize their own profits. For example, 779 possible behaviors such as bidder collusion or the use of grid reliability 780 information in the bidding process, unless such behaviors are specifically 781 prohibited by the organization. 782 4. DR Resource can be used to enhance grid reliability or to facilitate market 783 operations. However, regulation and legal agreements require a separation 784 between electric system operations and market functions. 785 5. DR Controlling Entity has little to no control over the physical environment in which DR Assets reside in. 786 787 788 3.2.2 Core Operational Assumptions 789 This document assumes that organizations will operate Open ADR systems in the 790 following manner: 791 1. Open ADR services shall be provided via existing, well established IP 792 based communication protocols. 793 2. The DRCE shall provide messaging standards that will be used to exchange all DR related information. In addition, all participants will 794 795 adhere to these standards. 796 3. Open ADR systems will operate in such a way as to minimize the need for 797 human intervention as much as possible. 798 4. DR Resources are responsible for physical control of assets under their 799 purview. 800 5. The triggers for DR Event(s) may not be predictable or may even lie 801 outside the DRCE's control. It is presumed that DRCE will receive 802 instructions from authoritative entities at unpredictable times (e.g. during

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	42
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	

803 804 805	oscillations in the grid due to external causes such as transmission line faults).
806	3.2.2 Security Principles
807 808	These objectives served as the "ground rules" for the Open ADR systems and helped with use case development and failure identification. The 13 objectives are as follows:
809 810	1. Security controls should have minimal impact on the primary mission of the Open ADR.
811 812	2. DR Resource/Asset should only accept and respond to authorized and valid DR messages in a timely manner.
813	3. Open ADR participants should only perform as intended.
814 815 816 817	4. Open ADR should employ different types of security measures depending on the risks associated with different types of DR events in order to facilitate efficient operations of Open ADR applications (see Figure 1 below).
818 819	a. if personally identifiable information (PII) is introduced to the signal, confidentiality becomes increasingly important.
820 821	b. if Direct Load Control is introduced to the signal, integrity becomes increasingly important.
822 823	c. if faster response times are required, availability and low latency become increasingly important.
824 825	 No unauthorized or unauthenticated download of software (firmware, configuration, etc.) shall be accepted by Open ADR system components.
826 827	6. Open ADR systems should be able to determine the source of DR event messages and its intended recipients at all times.
828 829	 All control activity (configuration changes, access requests, etc.) on the Open ADR system shall be auditable.
830 831	8. The integration of Open ADR systems should not expose other utility systems to unauthorized access or attack.
832 833	 Only the authorized personnel should have physical access to Open ADR system devices.
834 835	10. Open ADR systems should support non-repudiation of all transactions between the DR controlling entity and DR Resource/Asset.
836 837	11. Asset owners must not rely on security measures outside their direct observation and control for protection from unauthorized access.

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	43
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	

838 839	12. Users shall not be allowed to perform any action that falls outside of their assigned role.
840	13. Open ADR applications should not reveal sensitive, personally identifiable
841	information.

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	44
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	

842 **3.3 Failures**

843 Generic Failures defined in the Generic Failures Table are mapped to each uses case step

- 844 below.
- 845

Table 1 - Generic Failures Mapped to Use Case Step

	-	Indicates the failure does NOT apply to this Use Case step
[х	Indicates the failure DOES apply to this Use Case step

		U	21				UC2	2			UC3	;				UC4	ļ				U	C5		ι	JC6.	1	ι	JC6.	2			UC7	7		UC	:8
Failure #	S1	S2	S 3	S4	S1	S2	S3	S4	S5	S1	S2	S 3	S1	S2	S 3	S4	S5	S6	S7	S1	S2	S3	S4	S1	S2	S 3	S1	S2	S 3	S1	S2	S 3	S4	S5	S1	S2
GF1	х	1	-	х	х	-	-	х	-	х	-	-	х	-	х	-	-	х	-	х	-	х	-	х	-	-	1	х	-	х	-	-	х	-	х	-
GF2	-	х	-	-	•	х	-	•	х	•	х	-	•	х	١	х	I	I	х	-	х	-	х	-	х	1	I	-	х	-	х	-	-	х	-	х
GF3	-	х	-	-	-	х	-	-	х	-	х	-	-	х	-	х	-	-	х	-	х	-	х	-	х	-	-	-	х	-	х	-	-	х	-	х
GF4	-	-	х	-	-	-	х	-	-	-	-	х	-	-	-	-	х	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	х	х	-	-	-	-	х	-	-	-	-
GF5	х	-	-	х	х	-	-	х	-	х	-	-	х	-	х	-	-	х	-	х	-	х	-	х	-	-	-	х	-	х	-	-	х	-	х	-
GF6	х	-	-	х	х	-	-	х	-	х	-	-	х	-	х	-	-	х	-	х	-	х	-	х	-	-	-	х	-	х	-	-	х	-	х	-
GF7	-	-	х	х	-	-	х	х	-	-	-	х	-	-	х	-	х	х	-	-	-	х	-	-	-	х	-	-	-	-	-	х	х	-	-	-
GF8	х	-	-	х	х	-	-	х	-	х	-	-	х	-	х	-	-	х	-	х	-	х	-	х	-	-	-	х	-	х	-	-	х	-	х	-
GF9	-	-	х	х	-	-	х	х	-	-	-	х	-	-	х	-	х	х	-	-	-	х	-	-	-	х	-	-	-	-	-	х	х	-	-	-
GF10	х	-	-	х	х	-	-	х	-	х	-	-	х	-	х	-	-	х	-	х	-	х	-	х	-	-	-	х	-	х	-	-	х	-	х	-
GF11	-	-	х	х	-	-	х	х	-	-	-	х	-	-	х	-	х	х	-	-	-	х	-	-	-	х	-	-	-	-	-	х	х	-	-	-
GF12	х	-	-	х	х	-	-	х	-	х	-	-	х	-	х	-	-	х	-	х	-	х	-	х	-	-	-	х	-	х	-	-	х	-	х	-
GF13	-	-	х	х	-	-	х	х	-	-	-	х	-	-	х	-	х	х	-	-	-	х	-	-	-	х	-	-	-	-	-	х	х	-	-	-
GF14	-	-	х	х	-	-	х	х	-	-	-	х	-	-	х	-	х	х	-	-	-	х	-	-	-	х	-	-	-	-	-	х	х	-	-	-
GF15																																				
GF16																																				
GF17	-	-	х	-	1	-	х	1	1	1	-	х	1	1	х	1	х	I	1	1	I	х	-	-	1	х	1	-	х	-	-	х	-	-	-	-
GF18																																				
GF19	-	1	-	-	-	-	х	-	1	-	-	х	-	-	1	-	х	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	х	-	-	-	-	х	-	-	-	-

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848 Generic Failures

- 849 Generic failures apply to all the roles with in OpenADR.
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- 851

Table 2 Generic Failures

Failure ID	Definition	Explanation	Examples
F1	<role> does not send a message in a timely manner.</role>	The transmission of a message must occur within a particular span of time but the role fails to start the transmission within that span.	DRCE fails to notify DR Asset of upcoming DR Event(s) during the notification period.
F2	<role> does not receive a message in a timely manner due to flooding or jamming attacks (Denial of Service attacks) on the</role>	The reception of a message must occur within a particular span of time, but the role fails to initiate reception of the message in that time due to	1) DR Asset fails to receive information regarding upcoming DR Event(s) due to DoS attack on owner's

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	45
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	

	communications channel.	DoS attacks.	other assets. 2) DRCE fails to receive registration request due to DoS attack on DRCE server.
F3	manner due to internal	The reception of a message must occur within a particular span of time, but the role fails to initiate reception of the message in that time due to internal errors such as receive buffer overflow.	1) DR Asset fails to receive information regarding upcoming DR Event(s) due to a compromised NIC. 2) DRCE fails to receive registration request due to compromised software/configuration.
F4	<role> fails to execute action in a timely fashion after receiving a legitimate message</role>	The role fails to execute a command within the required span of time.	DR Asset fails to respond to DR Event(s) after acknowledgment and commitment.
F5	an incorrect recipient	The role addresses a message to recipients that do not require the message or are incapable of processing the message.	
F6	<role> sends an unauthorized message</role>	in spite of a prohibition against doing so or in violation of limits on the sender's use of network resources.	message to another
F7	from an unauthorized	The role accepts a message that comes from a source that is not authorized to send information to the role.	1) DR Asset responds to a DR Event which was initiated by another DR Asset. 2) DR Asset responds to a DR Event for a program in which it is not enrolled. 3) DRCE registers a faulty (i.e., imposter) DR Asset.

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	46
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	

F8	type of message	The role sends a message containing information other than what is required by the recipient.	1) DR Asset sends acknowledgement instead of registration request. 2) DRCE sends Objective Event instead of Load Control Event.
F9	processes an incorrect type of message	The role receives a message other than the type that is expected, but processes that message regardless.	DR Asset receives and processes a Load Control Event, when it should only respond to Pricing Events.
F10	formatted message	The role transmits a message using a protocol or message format that is not understood by the recipient and therefore cannot be processed by the recipient.	DRCE sends a DR Event notification message which violates the messaging standards defined by the organization. Such messages cannot be processed by the recipient.
F11	corrupted/wrong message.	The role processes a message with an expected type from a legitimate source but that is ill formed or has been manipulated in transit (e.g. Man-In-the-middle attack).	DR Asset responds to a DR Event message that has been modified in transit by an unauthorized third party.
F12		The role transmits a message that is not required or expected by a legitimate recipient.	.DR Asset sends an acknowledgement for an unpublished DR Event.
F13		The role receives a message that is not expected but processes the message regardless.	DRCE receives affirmative acknowledgement for an unpublished Event and incorporates it into performance calculations.
F14		configuration settings regardless of their integrity or	DR Asset is configured to independently generate and transmit DR Event(s) to other DR Assets.
F15		<role> fails to protect against data being modified or</role>	The List of scheduled DR Events is

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	47
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	

		is irreversible, or both	corrupted by a misconfigured process, resulting in an unusable schedule.
F16	<role> fails to protect information or resources against unauthorized access and manipulation</role>	device to read or modify data without regard for their	An unauthorized entity is able to access and modify the list of scheduled DR Events.
F17		credentials of a device or individual, improperly marks the message as erroneous, or	DR Resource rejects a valid DR Event message due to authentication software errors.
F18	<role> fails to prevent exhaustion of storage space.</role>	sufficient resources to storing data and the exhaustion of	The list of scheduled DR Events exceeds storage space, causing unpredictable loss of data.
F19	its data, or its internal state	inappropriate to its mission or operation state. This can occur when software is corrupted prior to being placed into a particular device.	DR Asset is instructed to increase its power consumption during high price periods or to decrease its power consumption during low price periods, or both.

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855 Specific Failures

Specific Failures are failures associated with specific OpenADR roles that are critical to
the mission or operational state of the system.

858

Definition

Explanation

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	48
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	40

	or respond to DR event signals	DR Resource is physically removed or damaged due to equipment failures or malicious activities and cannot respond to DR Event(s).
SF2		A malicious user gains physical access to communication and storage devices.
SF3	<role> is synchronized to a wrong time source</role>	Either DRCE or DR Resource is synchronized to a wrong time source
SF4	DR Resource responds to DR Event(s) that has already ended	This may happen due to poor configuration settings or as the result of replay attacks.
SF5	DR Resource denies receiving DR event information	DR Resource/Asset does not respond to scheduled DR Event(s) and then denies receiving the related information.
SF6		A malicious attacker gains sensitive information by eavesdropping on DR related messages in transit.
SF7		Same DR Resource/Asset enrolls in a DR program multiple times pretending as if they are different physical entities attempting to gain financial profit.

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	49
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	

4. Security Controls

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862 This section defines the set of recommended security controls for OpenADR systems and components as that satisfy the functionality of the roles and use cases delineated earlier in 863 this document. Many of the security controls in this document are inspired by and 864 865 intended to cover the technical requirements found in NIST IR 7628 as applied to Demand Response technology and related systems. The controls presented herein may 866 867 then, in turn, be satisfied by communications protocol definition-level standards and manufacturing specifications. This section defines the controls, and assigns the controls 868 869 to roles.

870 4.1 Scope of Security Controls

871 The scope of network topology of OpenADR systems defined in this document is limited

to the interactions between a paired DR Controlling Entity and DR Resource over a

873 public (Internet) or private network. The Network Architecture at these points should

follow best practices for securing internal systems. The specific practices are out of scope

- 875 of this document. Numerous documents on best practices are available on the NIST
- 876 Computer Security Resource Center (http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/index.html), and are
- 877 summarized in "Generally Accepted Principles and Practices for Securing Information
- 878 Technology Systems" (<u>http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-14/800-14.pdf</u>).
- 879 Securing internal systems is also addressed by corporate or other organizational policies 880 that are also out of scope. The process for tailoring security controls to an organization

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	50
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	00

- are outlined in Section 3.3 of "NIST SP 800-53 Recommended Security Controls for
- 882 Federal Information Systems and Organizations"⁷ This includes "Specifying
- 883 organization-defined parameters in the security controls via explicit assignment and
- selection statements to complete the definition of the tailored baseline"⁷. An example of
- an organization defined parameter as used in a control is:
- 886 "SC-5 DENIAL OF SERVICE PROTECTION

887 Control: The information system protects against or limits the effects of the following

- types of denial of service attacks: [Assignment: organization-defined list of types of $\sqrt{7}$
- denial of service attacks or reference to source for current list]."⁷

890 **4.2** Control Definitions

The process for defining the controls in this document is based on an analysis of the
roles, use cases, and failures defined in this profile along with careful examination of the
NIST IR 7628, the WAMPAC Security Profile, Distribution Management Security
Profile, and other collections of security standards and best practices. The process for
deriving the controls includes the following steps (with natural iteration and review):

- Examine the failures and associated controls from the WAMPAC Security Profile
 for similarities to the failures as defined in this document and for potential re-use
 of control material.
- Re-write selected controls from the WAMPAC Security Profile to apply to
 OpenADR systems. Verify, augment, or correct the mapping of each re-written
 control to the OpenADR failures.
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 903
 3. Examine the list of OpenADr failures for complete coverage. Compose new controls as needed to ensure all OpenADR failures are addressed.
- 4. Explicitly document the applicability of each control to roles or network
 segments. Tailor and/or split controls where necessary to accommodate
 implementation and environmental constraints for each role or network segment.
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- 913 This document does not attempt to cover general information technology cyber security,
- 914 cyber security best practices for other control systems, or organizational-level cyber

⁷ "NIST SP 800-53 – Recommended Security Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations" (http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-53-Rev3/sp800-53-rev3-final_updated-errata_05-01-2010.pdf)

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	51
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	U

915 security requirements that would apply to all or multiple smart grid systems. Substantial 916 guidance is already available on these subjects, and may be found in such documents as:

- 917 COBIT – the Control Objectives for Information and related Technology is an IT 918 governance framework and supporting toolset that allows managers to bridge the 919 gap between control requirements, technical issues and business risks. COBIT 920 enables clear policy development and good practice for IT control throughout 921 organizations. COBIT emphasizes regulatory compliance, helps organizations to 922 increase the value attained from IT, enables alignment and simplifies 923 implementation of the COBIT framework. (http://www.isaca.org/Knowledge-924 Center/COBIT/Pages/Overview.aspx) 925 ISO 27000 series – consists of several parts numbering from 27001 – 27006 that 926 provide a specification for an information security management system (ISMS). 927 This work supersedes the BS7799 standard. 928 (http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_catalogue/catalogue_tc/catalogue_detail.htm?csnumb er=41933) 929 930 ITIL (Information Technology Infrastructure Library) – ITIL is a widely adopted • 931 approach for IT Service Management. It provides a practical, no-nonsense 932 framework for identifying, planning, delivering and supporting IT services to the 933 business. (http://www.itil-officialsite.com) 934 NIST SP 800-53 – Recommended Security Controls for Federal Information 935 Systems and Organizations – provides guidelines for selecting and specifying 936 security controls for information systems supporting the executive agencies of the 937 federal government to meet the requirements of FIPS 200, Minimum Security 938 Requirements for Federal Information and Information Systems. The guidelines 939 apply to all components of an information system that process, store, or transmit 940 federal information. (http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-53-Rev3/sp800-53-rev3-final updated-errata 05-01-2010.pdf) 941 942 This document's primary point of reference for broader cyber security guidance is the 943 NIST IR 7628, and as such, these controls do not address the requirements in the NIST 944 IR 7628 that apply to organizational policy. The controls herein are strictly focused on 945 detailed recommendations for building and implementing OpenADR systems and 946 technology where guidance may not be found in other broadly accepted reference 947 material. 948 The following tables define technical security controls that, if followed, will improve the 949 security of a OpenADR system. The elements of each control include: 950 • Control ID: This ID is composed of the control's category and a sequence number 951 within that category. 952 Short Name: This is a unique string that concisely references the intent of the • 953 control.
- Definition: This is the text that defines the control itself.

- Reference(s): These are the requirements from the NIST IR 7628 that are • partially or fully satisfied by the control. Requirements listed in parenthesis are not required by the NIST IR 7628, but are included here for completeness.
- 957
 - Failure(s): These are the failures from Section 3.3 addressed by the control. •
- 958 959
- 960

4.2.1 Access Control 961

962

Table 3 – Controls: Access Control

Control ID	Short Name	Definition	Reference(s)	Failure(s
Access Control.01			SG.AC-3	F6
	Management	authorize, activate, modify and remove user accounts within the organization-defined time period when changes occur on user accounts and associated privileges.	SG.AU-2	F16
Access Control.02	Least Privilege	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	SG.AC-6	F16
		within a system the most restrictive set of privileges needed for the performance of authorized tasks.	SG.AC-7	
			SG.SC-19	
			SG.SC-29	
Access Control.03	Unsuccessful Access Attempts	The system: 1. Enforces a limit of organization-defined number of consecutive invalid login attempts by a user during an organization-defined time period. 2. When the maximum number of unsuccessful attempts is exceeded, automatically locks the account/node for an organization- defined, exponentially increasing time period or until released by an administrator with appropriate safety considerations (e.g., emergency override). 3. When automatic locks are triggered, alerts shall be raised to the administrator.	SG.AC-8	F16
Access Control.04	Concurrent Session Management	The system shall limit the number of concurrent connections DR Resource may establish with DRCE. The number of concurrent sessions shall be limited to the minimum necessary for proper operation of the Open ADR system. (More than 1 concurrent session requires justification.)	SG.AC-11	F1 F4
Access Control.05	Session Duration	by expiring or terminating the session after no more than (TBD) of inactivity with appropriate safety considerations. 2. Sessions must be reestablished using appropriate identification and authentication procedures. 3. The existing information on the display shall be obfuscated	SG.AC-12 SG.AC-13	F1 F4
		during session lock. This requirement might be inappropriate in the context of long polling.		
Access Control.06		The system limits attachment of portable devices and media to allow only specifically authorized users to do so. The default state shall disable all access from portable devices and media. Attachment of portable devices and media shall be enabled only where it is necessary for operation and/or	SG.AC-17	F16

UCA International Users Group

December 15, 2011

Control ID	Short Name	Definition	Reference(s)	Failure(s)
		maintenance functions. The system prevents the automated execution of code located on portable media. Mobile devices traveling to high risk locations shall be appropriately hardened and subsequently sanitized upon return; i.e., such mobile devices shall contain only minimal information required to conduct business during the use period.		
Access Control.07	Remote Access Restrictions	The organization autoenticates remote access, and uses	SG.AC-15	F6
		access sessions; The Open ADR system routes all remote accesses through a limited number of managed access control points;	SG.SC-18	F7
Access Control.08	Password Management	<role> enforces the use of strong user passwords, in accordance with FIPS 112, and protects user passwords from potential exposure. This includes: 1. Ensuring that passwords never cross component boundaries in the clear. 2. Ensuring that passwords are never stored and that stored password hashes use a cryptographic one-way hash function in accordance with FIPS 180-2. 3. Ensuring that passwords are never included in or allowed to be embedded into tools, source code, scripts, URLs, aliases, or shortcuts. 4. Enforcing password complexity policies (minimum length of at least 10 characters with a combination of lower/upper case, numerals, and special characters). 5. Changing passwords at defined intervals and minimizing reuse. 6. Expiring passwords after defined intervals of inactivity. 7. Protecting the password store from unauthorized modification.</role>		F16

964 4.2.2 Audit and Accountability

965

Table 4 – Controls: Audit and Accountability

Control ID	Short Name	Definition	Reference(s)	Failure(s)
Audit and Accountability.01	Inappropriate User Activity	Each role shall monitor all user activity and report indications of inappropriate or unusual activity as defined by the organization.	SG.AU-2	F14 F16 F19 SF7
Audit and Accountability.02	Contents of Audit Records for DR Resource	DR Resource shall produce audit records for each DR event that has occurred. The content of the audit records shall include date and time of the event, identity of the DR Resource where the event occurred and the state of DR Resource.	SG.AU-15	F14 F16 F17 F19 SF3 SF4
RITY PROFILE FOR OF	PENADR	·		Version — 0.02
nternational Users Group	0			December 15, 2011

Control ID	Short Name	Definition	Reference(s)	Failure(s)
				SF5
Audit and Contents of Audit DRCE shall produce audit records for each DR Accountability.03 Records for DRCE event that has occurred. The content of the audit records shall include date and time of the event, type of the DR signal, identity of the user who issued the DR event, identity of the DR Resource where the event occurred and the state of DR Resources as the result of the event.	Records for DRCE event that has occurred. The content of the audit records shall include date and time of the event,	SG.AU-3 SG.AU-15	F14 F16	
		F17 F19 SF3 SF4		
				SF5 SF7
Audit and Accountability.04	Electronic Log Format	The system shall make all physical access logs to facilities containing communication and storage devices of DRCE (e.g., DRAS) available in electronic form suitable for long term storage and retrieval.	SG.AU-4	SF2
Audit & Accountability.05	Local and Central Logging	<role> shall maintain a local log of all local authority actions at the highest level of detail available for the longest period of time that local</role>	SG.AU-2 SG.AU-4	F14 F16
		storage space permits which shall be at least (TBD, might be different depending on whether the role is DRCE or DR Resource). <role> shall forward all log entries to a dedicated logging server via its management server or directly to the log server . Retain centrally stored logs for at least (TBD), with a minimum of (TBD) immediately available for analysis.</role>	SG.AU-16	F19
Audit & Accountability.06	User Access Monitoring/Logging	The system shall monitor and log all user interactive sessions to <role> including all administrative and maintenance activities.</role>	SG.AU-16 (SG.MA-6)	F16 F19

967 4.2.3 Configuration Management

968

Table 5 - Controls: Configuration Management

Control ID	Short Name	Definition	Reference(s)	Failure(s)
Configuration Management.01	Access Restrictions for Configuration Change	Each role shall accept and apply configuration changes only from authenticated and authorized users. In addition, each role shall document all configuration changes.	SG.CM-5	F7 F14
Configuration Management.02	Factory Default Credentials	The system shall force a change of all factory default access and authentication credentials on DR Resource upon installation.	SG.CM-10	F14 F19
Configuration	Systems Inventory	The system shall create and maintain (on at least a daily basis) an inventory of Open ADR systems and devices that	SG.CM-8	F16

December 15, 2011

UCA International Users Group

Control ID	Short Name	Definition	Reference(s)	Failure(s)
Management.03		includes information that uniquely identifies each component, such as manufacturer, type, serial number, version number, and location (logical and physical).		F19
Configuration Management.04	Current Configuration	A designated system or systems shall daily or on request obtain current version numbers, installation date, configuration settings, and patch level on <role>; validate the sender's cryptographic signature; and compare this information with recorded values in the inventory and configuration databases. All discrepancies shall be logged and alerts shall be generated where appropriate.</role>	(SG.CM-6) SG.SI-2 SG.SI-7	F14 F19
Configuration Management.05	Disabling Unnecessary Communication Services	All networking and communication capabilities not required for the operation or maintenance of the system shall be disabled. This includes VOIP, instant messaging, ftp, HTTP, file sharing. Vendor defaults for all wireless options should be initially set "off". Any unused ports must be disabled. FTP, HTTP, Telnet shall be disabled and secure versions of these protocols, Secure FTP, Secure Copy Protocol, HTTP over TLS, and Secure Shell, must be used instead. Modems should be disabled by default. Every modem port and LAN port should be disabled by default.	SG.CM-7 SG.SC-17	F7 F12 F13

970 4.2.4 Continuity of Operation

971

Table 6 - Controls: Continuity of Operations

Control ID	Short Name	Definition	Reference(s)	Failure(s)
Continuity of Operation.01	Alternate Storage	DRCE shall provide an alternate storage to store essential configuration settings (e.g., participants and DR programs they are enrolled in).	SG.CP-7	F15 F16 F18
Continuity of Operation.02	Alternate Telecommunication Services	channel between DRCE and DR Resource when the	SG.CP-8 SG.SC-5	F2
Continuity of Operations.03	Operations Continuity	The system shall provide means to compensate for loss of a single component implementing DRCE without loss of system functionality.	(SG.PE-12) SG.SC-5	SF2
Continuity of Operations.04	System Restoration	The system shall have the ability to recover DRCE from securely maintained backups, images, and configurations in the event of compromised device(s) or network (exception: hardware changes).	(SG.CP-10)	SF2
Continuity of Operations.05	Alternative Time Source	The <role> shall support alternative time source for redundancy and consistency checking.</role>	SG.SC-5	SF3 SF4

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	56
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	

973 4.2.5 Identification & Authentication

974

Table 7 - Controls: Identification & Authentication

Control ID	Short Name	Definition	Reference(s)	Failure(s)
Identification & Authentication.01	ldentifier Management	The system shall assign (globally) unique identifiers to each individual and device. Within the context of this specification global refers to the system as a whole and does not include identifiers with respect to other systems.	SG.IA-2	F5 F6 F7 F16 F19 SF7
Identification & Authentication.02	Authenticator Feedback	The system shall obscure the feedback of authentication information during the authentication process (e.g., displaying asterisks when a user types in a password).	SG.IA-6	F16 F19
Identification & Authorization.03	Credential Management	The system shall provide a single point of initiation to distribute, manage, and revoke all logical and physical access credentials fo r all OPEN ADR systems and components. Revocation shall be carried out on all systems within 24 hours.	(SG.IA-3)	F16 F19
Identification & Authorization.04	Digital Certificates	DRCE shall provide cryptographically strong authentication credentials such as digital certificates signed by the organization (to which the DRCE belongs) or other trusted party (i.e., a trusted identity provider or vendor). Certificate issuance and signing must conform to a secure process such as NIST SP 800-53: FPKI Security Controls for PKI Systems and NIST SP 800-53A: Assessment Guidance for Security Controls in PKI Systems. The proof of authenticity must be generated by an organizational process that supports independent review, and credentials must be independently verifiable by external (to the organization) audit.	SG.AU-16 SG.AU-2 SG.IA-4	F7 F11
Identification & Authorization.05	Message Identities	<role> shall include in every message the identity of the sender and the intended recipient(s). The mechanisms used to meet the requirement of this control are intended to be applied within the message payload.</role>	SG.IA-5	F5 F6 F7
Identification & Authorization.06	Self Identification	Software shall be able to report identifying and configuration information on request. This should include version number, installation date, configuration settings, patch level.	SG.SC-12 SG.SI-7	F14 F19

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	57
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	07

976 4.2.6 Physical & Environment Security

977

Table 8 - Controls Physical & Environment Security

Control ID	Short Name	Definition	Reference(s)	Failure(s)
Physical& Environmental. 01	Physical Access Authentication of DRCE	The system shall implement a minimum of two factor (TBD) authentication for physical access to facilities containing communication and storage devices of DRCE (e.g., DRAS).	SG.PE-2	SF2
Physical& Environmental. 02	Monitoring/Logging of DRCE	Physical Access to facilities containing communication and storage devices of DRCE (e.g., DRAS) shall be monitored and logged at all times.	SG.PE-4	SF2
Physical & Environmental.03	Interactive Resources	Supporting systems shall limit physical access to <role> to only those personnel responsible for operating, maintaining, or managing the <role>.</role></role>	(SG.PE-3)	SF1 SF2
Physical & Environmental.04	for DRCE	The physical location of DRCE shall minimize potential damage from physical and environmental hazards and minimize the opportunity for unauthorized access.	(SG.PE-12)	SF2
Physical & Environmental.05		All facilities housing DRCE shall implement fire detection devices/systems. These devices/systems shall activate automatically and notify the organization and emergency responders in the event of a fire. All activations of the system shall be logged.		SF2

978

979 4.2.7 System & Communications Protection

980

Table 9 - Controls: System & Communications Protection

Control ID	Short Name	Definition	Reference(s)	Failure(s)
System & Communications Protection.01	Communication Integrity	and FIPS 186 compliant digital signature mechanisms.		F7 F11
System & Communication Protection.02	Communication Confidentiality	mechanisms on messages that contain of private	SG.SC-9 SG.IA-6	SF6
System & Communication Protection.03	Cryptographic Key Implementation and Management	The system shall provide a mechanism to generate cryptographic keys with sufficient randomness. In addition, the system shall provide efficient mechanism to revoke and refresh cryptographic keys.		F6 F7

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	58
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	00

Control ID	Short Name	Definition	Reference(s)	Failure(s)
System &	Multiple verification	The DRCE must provide alternate channels of notification in order to allow humans to verify and authorize interactions with the DRCE in scenarios where it is operationally	None	F7
Communication Protection.04				F9
		required to have multiple levels of verification and authorization before any actions be taken in response to a		F11
		message from the DRCE. (Applicable to Slow, Medium DR only)		F13
System &	Information Flow	The system shall provide dynamic control of DR event information flow based on changes of user accounts and	SG.AC-5	F3
Communication Protection.05	Enforcement	authorized roles	SG.AC-15	F5
			SG.SC-5	F6
			SG.SC-7	F7
				F12
				F13
System &	No Shared Accounts	shared accounts) with an account group/user group for	SG.SC-19	F14
Communication Protection.07		proper auditing, management, and tracking. Wherever possible, globally privileged accounts (e.g., SuperUser accounts, Administrator, or Root) shall be disabled and/or removed.		F16
				F19
System &	Emergency Network Segmentation	If an attack is detected, the system shall label all traffic from	NONE	F5
Communication Protection.08				F6
				F7
				F12
				F13
System &	Remote Interactive	including all administrative and maintenance activities.	SG.AC-15	F6
Communication Protection.09	Sessions		SG.SC-9	F7
			SG.SC-12	
System & Communication Protection.10	Resource Consumption	The <role> shall implement resource monitoring and control mechanisms for all devices/processes to identify and mitigate excessive resource consumption (e.g., runaway processes).</role>	SG.SC-6	F4
System &	Quality of Service -	DRCE shall use a QoS or other resource reservation	SG.SC-6	F1
Communication Protection.11	Specification	control mechanism on all outgoing communications. Relative priority for traffic related to Open ADR systems shall be from highest to lowest: 1) DR Event messages, 2) configuration and management,		F4
System &	Quality of Service -	The network shall process all traffic in accordance with the QoS or other resource reservation control identifier.	SG.SC-6	F1
Communication Protection.12	Enforcement			F3

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	59
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	00

982 4.2.8 System & Information Integrity

983

Table 10 - Controls: System & Information Integrity

Control ID	Short Name	Definition	Reference(s)	Failure(s)
System & nformation ntegrity.01		The system shall implement intrusion detection systems to monitor and detect malicious traffic passing between the network segments.	SG.AC-15	F6 F12
System & nformation ntegrity.02	Clock Record	DR Resource's clock record shall indicate time source used for synchronization and when last synchronized.	NONE	SF 3
System & nformation ntegrity.03	End Point Security	<roles> using a general purpose operating system shall implement end point security mechanisms to scan software for malicious code.</roles>	SG.SI-3	F19
System & nformation ntegrity.04		The system shall provide the capability to isolate compromised devices from the rest of the Open ADR system upon detection of compromise. This includes the capability to physically disconnect DR Resource from the grid by collaborating with authoritative entities if such actions are deemed necessary.	NONE	F6 F7
System & nformation ntegrity.05	Check	The system shall maintain a complete image of all currently deployed component software. All components shall maintain a hash of installed software, including patches. Any update to component software shall require a recalculation of the hash. A periodic integrity check of all component software shall be performed by comparing the hash on the component to the hash in the repository. This check shall be performed at least once every (TBD) days. Acceptable technologies shall be specified by FIPS 186.	SG.SC-12 SG.SI-7	F19
System & nformation ntegrity.06	Check	<role> shall perform automated checks (e.g., file system checks, database integrity checks, and checksum comparisons) to validate the integrity of the logical and physical media on a periodic basis as defined by the organization, in no cases exceeding (TBD) week between checks. Integrity checks shall verify the media is in adequate condition to perform the functions assigned to <role>, and shall immediately report any abnormalities or problems discovered during the scan to the administrator of <role>.</role></role></role>	NONE	F15
	Monitoring	The system periodically interrogates and validates current connectivity by observing communication from DRCE on at least a daily basis. All results shall be recorded in an associated log file. Any results indicating an error (as determined by preset conditions) shall alert the system manager.	NONE	F2
System & nformation ntegrity.08		<role> shall validate all application protocol fields that it uses for logical and expected values including source, destination, time stamps, and state indicators. <role> shall use its context and history when assessing the validity of the message. For example, DR Resource should check the type of DR Program it is enrolled in before processing the</role></role>	SG.SI-8	F9 F11 F8 F10

 SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR
 Version - 0.02
 60

 UCA International Users Group
 December 15, 2011

Control ID	Short Name	Definition	Reference(s)	Failure(s)
		DR Event Notification Message.		
System & Information Integrity.09	Minimal Error Message Content	<role> shall not reveal potentially harmful (e.g., exploitable) information in error messages.</role>	SG.SI-9	F16
System & Information Integrity.10	Message Time stamping	<role> shall time stamp all configuration and management messages that it sends.</role>	NONE	SF4
System & Information Integrity.11	Configuration File Authenticity	configuration files that is not cryptographically signed. Acceptable technologies shall be specified by FIPS 186.	SG.AU-16 SG.SC-12 SG.SI-7	F3 F11 F14
System & Information Integrity.12	Configuration File and Sensitive Data Integrity Check	Configuration files and other sensitive data should include cryptographic integrity checks (e.g., cryptographic hashes) and the integrity of the file should be checked whenever it is read by an application.	SG.SI-7	F3 F14
System & Information Integrity.13	Software and Firmware Authenticity	do not have cryptographically signed message payloads, nor shall a system execute any software or firmware before validating its cryptographic signature. Accentable	SG.AU-16 SG.SC-12 SG.SI-7	F11 F19

984 4.2.9 Controls Mapped to Roles

985

Table 11 - Controls Mapped to Roles

Control ID	Short Name	DR Controlling Entity	DR Resource
Access Control.01	Automated Account Management	х	x
Access Control.02	Least Privilege	х	x
Access Control.03	Unsuccessful Access Attempts	х	x
Access Control.04	Concurrent Session Management		x
Access Control.05	Session Duration	х	x
Access Control.06	Portable Device Attachment	х	х

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	61
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	01

Control ID	Short Name	DR Controlling Entity	DR Resource
Access Control.07	Remote Access Restrictions	x	х
Access Control.08	Password Management	x	х
Audit and Accountability.01	Inappropriate User Activity	x	х
Audit and Accountability.02	Contents of Audit Records for DR Resource		x
Audit and Accountability.03	Contents of Audit Records for DRCE	x	
Audit and Accountability.04	Electronic Log Format	x	
Audit & Accountability.05	Local and Central Logging	x	х
Audit & Accountability.06	User Access Monitoring/Logging	x	x
Configuration Management.01	Access Restrictions for Configuration Change	x	x
Configuration Management.02	Factory Default Credentials		
Configuration Management.03	Systems Inventory	x	x
Configuration Management.04	Current Configuration	x	х
Configuration Management.05	Disabling Unnecessary Communication Services	x	х
Continuity of Operation.01	Alternate Storage	x	
Continuity of Operation.02	Alternate Telecommunication Services	x	x
Continuity of Operations.03	Operations Continuity	x	х
Continuity of Operations.04	System Restoration	x	
Continuity of Operations.05	Alternative Time Source		х
Identification & Authentication.01	Identifier Management	x	х
Identification & Authentication.02	Authenticator Feedback	x	x

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	62
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	02

Control ID	Short Name	DR Controlling Entity	DR Resource
Identification & Authorization.03	Credential Management	x	х
Identification & Authorization.04	Digital Certificates	х	
Identification & Authorization.05	Message Identities	х	x
Identification & Authorization.06	Self Identification	x	x
Physical& Environmental. 01	Physical Access Authentication of DRCE	x	
Physical& Environmental. 02	Facility Access Monitoring/Logging of DRCE	х	
Physical & Environmental.03	Limited Access - Interactive Resources	x	х
Physical & Environmental.04	Component Location for DRCE	х	
Physical & Environmental.05	Fire Detection	x	
System & Communications Protection.01	Communication Integrity	х	х
System & Communication Protection.02	Communication Confidentiality	х	х
System & Communication Protection.03	Cryptographic Key Implementation and Management	х	x
System & Communication Protection.04	Multiple verification		х
System & Communication Protection.05	Information Flow Enforcement	х	x
System & Communication Protection.07	No Shared Accounts	x	х
System & Communication Protection.08	Emergency Network Segmentation	x	х
System & Communication Protection.09	Remote Interactive Sessions	х	х

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	63
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	00

Control ID	Short Name	DR Controlling Entity	DR Resource
System & Communication Protection.10	Resource Consumption	x	
System & Communication Protection.11	Quality of Service Specification	x	
System & Communication Protection.12	Quality of Service Enforcement	х	х
System & Information Integrity.01	Intrusion Detection	x	х
System & Information Integrity.02	Clock Record		х
System & Information Integrity.03	End Point Security	х	x
System & Information Integrity.04	End Point Isolation	x	х
System & Information Integrity.05	Software Integrity Check	х	х
System & Information Integrity.06	Storage Integrity Check	х	х
System & Information Integrity.07	Network Quality Monitoring	x	
System & Information Integrity.08	Message Validation		х
System & Information Integrity.09	Minimal Error Message Content	x	х
System & Information Integrity.10	Message Time stamping	x	х
System & Information Integrity.11	Configuration File Authenticity	x	х
System & Information Integrity.12	Configuration File and Sensitive Data Integrity Check	х	х
System & Information Integrity.13	Software and Firmware Authenticity	x	x

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	64
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	01

988

Appendix A: Relation to the NIST Interagency Report 7628

989	A goal of the OpenADR security profile is to support and align with the NIST IR 7628.
990	This document approaches analyzing each interface at each process step in regard to
991	failure analysis and control development (refer to Figure 6).

992 A.1 Traceability

This section documents the traceability found between the NIST IR 7628 and the
OpenADR Security Profile. The OpenADR Security Profile incorporates the NIST IR
7628 in each of the five major phases of the security profile development.

996 1. Scope - This document incorporates a review and analysis of NIST IR 7628 use 997 cases to guide the development of OpenADR scope. 998 2. Logical Architecture – This document incorporates a review and analysis of 999 relevant architectural elements from the NIST IR 7628 in the OpenADR logical 1000 architecture development, re-using actors where possible and further 1001 decomposing the architecture where needed. 1002 3. Security Influences – This document incorporates an analysis of the security 1003 objectives defined in the NIST IR 7628 use cases in developing and expanding 1004 security principles for OpenADR. 1005 4. Security Controls – This document used the relevant technical requirements from 1006 NIST IR 7628 as a source of inspiration for the development of the controls for 1007 this security profile. The NIST IR 7628 controls were also used as a means to SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR Version -0.02

UCA International Users Group

- verify coverage by way of identifying controls that this document might not haveotherwise considered.
- 1010 5. Validation the validation step is an iterative process in the development of a
- security profile. This document incorporates a review of the NIST IR 7628controls and actor-to-control mappings as a means to ensure completeness in the
- 1013 OpenADR Security Profile.




Figure 6 – Security Profile Workflow NIST-IR 7628 Mapping

1016 A.2 NIST IR 7628 Actors to WAMPAC Roles Mapping

1017 This section documents the mapping from NIST IR 7628 actors to WAMPAC Security

- 1018 Profile roles. This document uses the term "Role" to denote the function performed by
- 1019 the object within the use cases since a given device may perform more than one function.
- 1020 This approach supported the understanding of security failures and controls at the lowest
- 1021 level practical.

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	66
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	00

- By comparison, although subtle, an "Actor" as defined by the OMG for unified modelinglanguage is:
- 1024 *A type of role played by an entity that interacts with the subject, but which is*
- 1025 external to the subject. Actors may represent roles played by human users,
- 1026 external hardware, or other subjects. Note that an actor does not necessarily
- 1027 *represent a specific physical entity but merely a particular facet (i.e., "role") of* 1028 *some entity that is relevant to the specification of its associated use cases. Thus, a*
- 1028 some entry that is relevant to the specification of its associated use cases. Thus, 1029 single physical instance may play the role of several different actors and,
- 1029 single physical instance may play the role of several different actors and, 1030 conversely, a given actor may be played by multiple different instances. (p.604-5,
- 1030 Conversely, a given actor may be played by multiple afferent instances. (p.004-2 1031 OMG Unified Modeling Language (OMG UML), Superstructure Version 2.3)
- Briefly, NIST IR 7628 actors are entities that may perform many OpenADR roles. NIST
 IR 7628 actors are derived from Figure F-6, Volume 3 page F-21.
- 1034 The NIST IR 7628 actors that are omitted are out of scope for this security profile.
- 1035 Figure 7 Unified Logical Architecture for OpenADR depicts the areas of the Unified
- 1036 Logical Architecture potentially impacted by OpenADR interactions. The blue lines are
- 1037 communication links. The red lines are the communications from a DR Resource point-
- 1038 of-view.




Figure 7 – Unified Logical Architecture for OpenADR

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	67
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	01

Table 12 – NIST IR 7628 Actor to WAMPAC Role Mapping

NIST IR 7628 Actor Number	NIST IR 7628 Actor	Open ADR Role
27	Distribution Management System	DR Controlling Entity
41	Aggregator/Retail Energy Provider	DR Controlling Entity/DR Resource
32	Load Management Systems/Demand Response Management System	DR Controlling Entity
30	Energy Management System (EMS)	DR Controlling Entity
5	Customer Energy Management System	DR Resource
3	Customer Appliances and Equipment	DR Asset
4	Customer Distributed Energy Resources: Generation and Storage (DER)	DR Asset

A.3 NIST IR 7628 Security Objectives to Open ADR Security Principles Mapping

Table 13 - NIST IR 7628 Use Case Objectives to OpenADR Security Principles

NIST IR 7628 Scenario	Cyber Security Objective / Requirements	Open ADR Security Principle
Real-Time Pricing (RTP) for Customer Load and DER/PEV	Integrity, including non-repudiation, of pricing information is critical, since there could be large financial and possibly legal implications Availability, including non-repudiation, for pricing signals is critical because of the large financial and possibly legal implications Confidentiality is important mostly for the responses that any customer might make to the pricing signals	Transactive pricing signals are not in scope for OpenADR.

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	68
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	00

NIST IR 7628 Scenario	Cyber Security Objective / Requirements	Open ADR Security Principle
Time of Use (TOU) Pricing		
	meter reading	
Net Metering for DER and PEV	Integrity is not very critical since net metering pricing is fixed for long periods and is not generally transmitted electronically	1,13
	Availability is not an issue	
	Confidentiality is not an issue, except with respect to meter reading	
Feed-In Tariff Pricing for DER and PEV	Pricing for DER and fixed for long periods and is generally not transmitted	
	Availability is not an issue	
	Confidentiality is not an issue, except with respect to meter reading	
Critical Peak Pricing Critical Peak Pricing builds on TOU pricing by selecting a small number of days each year where the electric delivery system will be heavily stressed and increasing the peak (and sometime shoulder peak) prices by up to 10 times the normal peak price. This is intended to reduce the stress on the system during these days.		1,13
Load Management	Integrity of load control commands is critical to avoid unwarranted outages	1,2,3,4,6,7,8,10,11
	Availability for load control is important – in aggregate (e.g. > 300 MW), it can be critical	
	Confidentiality is not very important	

1049

1050 A.4 NIST IR 7628 Technical Requirements Mapped 1051 Open ADR Controls

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Table 14 - NIST IR 7628 Technical Requirements Mapped to OpenADR Controls

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	69
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	

NIST IR 7628 Requirement	NIST IR 7628 Short Name	Open ADR Control	Coverage
SG.AC-5	Information Flow Enforcement	System & Communication Protection.12	fully covered
SG.AC-6	Separation of Duties	Access Control.2 Access Control.3	covers non-organizational portions
SG.AC-7	Least Privilege	Access Control.2 Access Control.3	fully covered
SG.AC-8	Unsuccessful Login Attempts	Access Control.4	fully covered
SG.AC-11	Concurrent Session Control	Access Control.6	fully covered
SG.AC-12	Session Lock	Access Control.7	fully covered
SG.AC-13	Remote Session Termination	Access Control.7	fully covered
SG.AC-14	Permitted Actions without Identification or Authentication	Access Control.5	NIST IR 7628 is organizational, but supported by our control

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	70
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	10

NIST IR 7628 Requirement	NIST IR 7628 Short Name	Open ADR Control	Coverage
SG.AC-15	Remote Access	Access Control.3 Access Control.9 Access Control.10 Access Control.11 Identification & Authorization.3 Identification & Authorization.4 Identification & Authorization.5 Identification & Authorization.6 Network.2 System & Information Integrity.6 System & Communication Protection.10 System & Communication Protection.11 System & Communication Protection.12 System & Communication Protection.14	fully covered
SG.AC-16	Wireless Access	System & Communication Protection.17 Access Control.10	fully covered
	Restrictions	Access Control.11	
SG.AC-17	Access Control for Portable and Mobile Devices	Access Control.8	fully covered
SG.AC-21	Passwords	Access Control.12	fully covered
SG.AU-2	Auditable Events	Access Control.1 Access Control.5 Audit & Accountability.1 Audit & Accountability.3 Identification & Authorization.3	covers non-organizational portions
SG.AU-3	Content of Audit Records	Audit & Accountability.5	fully covered

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	71
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	

NIST IR 7628 Requirement	NIST IR 7628 Short Name	Open ADR Control	Coverage
SG.AU-4	Audit Storage Capacity	Audit & Accountability.3 Audit & Accountability.4 System & Information Integrity.24 System & Information Integrity.25	fully covered
SG.AU-15	Audit Generation	Audit & Accountability.5	fully covered
SG.AU-16	Non-Repudiation	Audit & Accountability.2 Audit & Accountability.3 Identification & Authorization.3 System & Communication Protection.10 System & Information Integrity.7 System & Information Integrity.9	fully covered
SG.CM-7	Configuration for Least Functionality	Configuration Management.3 Configuration Management.4	fully covered
SG.CM-8	Component Inventory	Configuration Management.1	fully covered
SG.IA-4	User Identification and Authentication	Identification & Authorization.4	fully covered
SG.IA-5	Device Identification and Authentication	Identification & Authorization.5 Identification & Authorization7	fully covered
SG.IA-6	Authenticator Feedback	Identification & Authorization.8	fully covered
SG.SC-2	Communications Partitioning	System & Communication Protection.1	fully covered
SG.SC-3	Security Function Isolation	System & Communication Protection.2	fully covered
SG.SC-4	Information Remnants	System & Communication Protection.3	partially covered; object reuse is not addressed by our control.

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	72
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	

NIST IR 7628 Requirement	NIST IR 7628 Short Name	Open ADR Control	Coverage
SG.SC-5	Denial-of-Service Protection	System & Communication Protection.12 Continuity of Operations.2 Continuity of Operations.3 Continuity of Operations.6	partially covered – NIST IR 7628 does not give specific guidance on how to meet requirement.
SG.SC-6	Resource Priority	System & Communication Protection.6 System & Communication Protection.7 System & Communication Protection.8	
SG.SC-7	Boundary Protection	Network.2 Network.4 Network.6 Network.8 Identification & Authorization.5 Identification & Authorization.6 System & Communication Protection.10 System & Communication Protection.11 System & Communication Protection.12 System & Communication Protection.13 System & Communication Protection.14	fully covered
SG.SC-8	Communication Integrity	Access Control.10 System & Communication Protection.10 System & Information Integrity.9	fully covered
SG.SC-9	Communication Confidentiality	System & Communication Protection.11 System & Communication Protection.16 System & Communication Protection.17 System & Communication Protection.18	fully covered

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	73
UCA International Users Group C	December 15, 2011	15

NIST IR 7628 Requirement	NIST IR 7628 Short Name	Open ADR Control	Coverage
SG.SC-10	Trusted Path	Access Control.3	fully covered
		Access Control.7	
		Access Control.10	
		Configuration Management.4	
		Identification & Authorization.1	
		Identification & Authorization.3	
		Identification & Authorization.4	
		Identification & Authorization.6	
		Identification & Authorization.7	
		Network.2	
		Network.4	
		Network.6	
		Network.8	
		Physical & Environmental.2	
		Physical & Environmental.3	
		Physical & Environmental.14	
		System & Communication Protection.4	
		System & Communication Protection.5	
		System & Communication Protection.10	
		System & Communication Protection.11	
		System & Communication Protection.12	
		System & Communication Protection.13	
		System & Communication Protection.14	
		System & Communication Protection.17	
		System & Communication Protection.20	
		System & Communication Protection.21	
		System & Communication Protection.22	
		System & Information Integrity.4	
		System & Information Integrity.6	
		System & Information Integrity.14	
Y PROFILE FOR (System & Information Integrity.17	
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NIST IR 7628 Requirement	NIST IR 7628 Short Name	Open ADR Control	Coverage
SG.SC-11	Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management	System & Communication Protection.18	fully covered
SG.SC-12	Use of Validated Cryptography	Access Control.10 Access Control.12 Identification & Authorization.9 System & Communication Protection.10 System & Communication Protection.11 System & Communication Protection.17 System & Information Integrity.7 System & Information Integrity.9 System & Information Integrity.10	fully covered
SG.SC-15	Public Key Infrastructure Certificates	Identification & Authorization.3	covers non-organizational portions
SG.SC-16	Mobile Code	System & Communication Protection.19	fully covered
SG.SC-17	Voice-Over Internet Protocol	Configuration Management.4 System & Communication Protection.9	fully covered
SG.SC-18	System Connections	Access Control.9 System & Communication Protection.20	fully covered
SG.SC-19	Security Roles	Access Control.2 Access Control.3 System & Communication Protection.21	covers non-organizational portions
SG.SC-20	Message Authenticity	Identification & Authorization.5 System & Communication Protection.20	fully covered
SG.SC-21	Secure Name/Address Resolution Service	System & Communication Protection.22	fully covered

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	75
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	10

NIST IR 7628 Requirement	NIST IR 7628 Short Name	Open ADR Control	Coverage
SG.SC-29	Application Partitioning	Access Control.2 and Access Control.3	seems redundant with NIST IR 7628 least privilege controls
SG.SC-30	Smart Grid Information System Partitioning	Network.1 - Network.8	fully covered
SG.SI-2	Flaw Remediation	Configuration Management.2 System & Information Integrity.1 System & Information Integrity.2	fully covered
SG.SI-7	Software and Information Integrity	Configuration Managment.2 Identification & Authorization.9 System & Information Integrity.7 System & Information Integrity.8 System & Information Integrity.9 System & Information Integrity.10	fully covered
SG.SI-8	Information Input Validation	System & Information Integrity.13 System & Information Integrity.14	fully covered
SG.SI-9	Error Handling	System & Information Integrity.15 System & Information Integrity.16	fully covered

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	76
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	77
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	••

Appendix B: Use Case Notation 1067 Guide


1068

1069 The use cases presented in Section 2.4 of this document include sequence diagrams that

1070 graphically depict the flow of information/data and activities performed by roles in order

to complete the use case. A sequence diagram represents role or actor behavior as a series 1071

1072 of sequential steps. An example is shown in Figure 8 below.



Version — 0.02	78	
December 15, 2011	10	

1074	Figure 8 – An Annotated Sequence Diagram
1075	This example is annotated to illustrate key features of the notation.
1076 1077 1078	1. Sequence Diagrams represent behavior of actors/roles as parallel vertical lines with the messages exchanged between them presented as parallel horizontal lines in the sequence that they occur.
1079 1080	2. The role name is presented at the top of each vertical line. The lines vertical line represents a timeline that flows from top to bottom
1081 1082	3. Messages are presented as a series of horizontal lines with the message name above the line. Dashed lines indicate a return message.
1083 1084	4. Message lines that begin and terminate with the same role indicate a message or action internal to the role.
1085 1086	5. A use case ends when all of its steps have been completed and the vertical lines end.

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	79
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	10

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Appendix C: Using the Security Profile to Evaluate an OpenADR Deployment

1090 This document can be used to evaluate the security of a proposed OpenADR deployment⁸. 1091 The security controls and the failure analysis in this security profile are based on the 1092 definition of uses cases and roles. In different OpenADR deployments, the use cases and 1093 roles will be mapped to different elements of the actual deployment. An architectural analysis 1094 of a proposed deployment against this document has the following steps. 1095 1096 1. Map the proposed deployment to the roles in Section 2. 1097 2. For each use case, use the mapping generated in step 2 and Failures mapped to Use Cases 1098 in Table xx (Section 3.2) to determine which elements are involved in the use case. 1099 3. For each instance of each use case, determine the possible failures, per role and per step. 1100 This information comes from the three failure tables in Section 3.3. Then determine the 1101 controls that mitigate each possible failure using the mappings in Section 0. 4. For each element of the proposed OpenADR deployment, determine the recommended 1102

1103 controls for that element. This involves mapping each element to the appropriate use

⁸ For more advice on how to use a Security Profile for the system lifecycle see : HOW A UTILITY CAN USE ASAP-SG SECURITY PROFILES by theAdvanced Security Acceleration Project for the Smart Grid (ASAP-SG)

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	80
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	00

- cases and use case steps, proceeding through possible failures and determining the
 recommended controls. This is the information gathered in steps 1-4 above.
- 5. For each element of the proposed OpenADR deployment, and each recommended control for that element, determine how the control is implemented. If the control is not implemented, ensure that all the failures that would be mitigated by the recommended control are being mitigated by one or more alternate controls. Perform a risk analysis to determine the adequacy of the alternate control(s).
- 1111 6. For each possible failure that is not mitigated, perform a risk analysis that determines the 1112 probability of the failure occurring and the cost if the failure does occur.
- 1113

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	81
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	01

Appendix D: Glossary and Acronyms

1117 Many of the definitions in this section have been adapted or directly quoted from Smart

1118 Grid Today's Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations.⁹

1119

1120 **ASAP-SG**: Advanced Security Acceleration Project for the Smart Grid. This group has

been tasked with developing security profiles for the smart grid to accelerate the

1122 development of security requirements & standards, requiring vendor products with built-

1123 in security, and provide tools for understanding failure mitigation and RFP language.

- **Authentication**: The process of verifying the identity that an entity (e.g., person, or a computer system) is what it represents itself to be
- 1125 computer system) is what it represents itself to be.
- 1126 Authorization: Specifying access rights to IT or electric power system resources.
- 1127 COBIT: Control Objectives for Information and related Technologies
- 1128 **CSWG**: Cyber Security Working Group. A sub-group formed under the Smart Grid
- 1129 Interoperability Panel to address the cyber security aspects of the Smart Grid
- 1130 Interoperability Framework.¹⁰

¹⁰ http://collaborate.nist.gov/twiki-sggrid/bin/view/SmartGrid/CyberSecurityCTG

UCA International Users Group

⁹ <u>http://www.smartgridtoday.com/public/department40.cfm</u>

1131 **Demand Response:** Demand Response, where "demand" is the utility term for the draw 1132 of electricity from the electric distribution system and "response" refers to actions taken 1133 by utility customers to reduce their demand. This term refers to a type of arrangement 1134 between utilities and customers that can take various forms but always refers to the 1135 agreement by customers to cut their use of electricity when the utility asks them to, or in 1136 some cases customers give the utility permission to remotely change the use of power 1137 within the customer's premises. Many DR arrangements are with big industrial 1138 consumers that agree to shut down some or all of their power use when the utility alerts 1139 them -- often via a phone call -- to a peak demand condition, and often with a financial 1140 consideration to mitigate the impact on the business of the customer. Programs for 1141 residential customers often use remote controls of thermostats, water heaters, swimming 1142 pool pumps and other appliances. Some DR programs offer financial incentives to the 1143 customer to have their power use reduced temporarily and others use variable power 1144 rates, boosting the cost of power to create an incentive for the customer to reduce power 1145 use as peak use times.⁹

1146 Demand Response Event: A DR Event consists of the time periods, deadlines, and
1147 transitions during which DR Resources perform. A DR Event Schedule consists of a
1148 Notification Period, Active Event Period, Ramp Period and Recovery Period. The Ramp
1149 Period is considered part of the Active Event Period. A DR Event can be partitioned into
1150 a continuous block of consecutive time periods called intervals. Events can also be open1151 ended. i.e. a Start Time without duration or end-time.¹¹

- 1152 **DG:** Distributed Generation
- 1153 **DHS**: Department of Homeland Security
- 1154 **Distributed Generation:** Power generation that is on the premises of the end user.
- 1155 **DOD**: Department of Defense
- 1156 **DMZ:** Demilitarized Zone
- 1157 **DNMTT:** Data and Network Management Task Team
- 1158 **DNSSec:** Domain Name System Security Extensions
- 1159 **DR:** Demand Response
- 1160 **DSL:** Digital Subscriber Line
- 1161 EMS: Energy Management System
- 1162 **External Application**: Applications that reside outside of the physical infrastructure of
- 1163 the demand response system.

¹¹ A more detailed definition of DR Event can be found in section "3.4.1 Temporal Model of a DR Event" in UCAIug OpenSG OpenADR Task Force, OpenADR 1.0 System Requirements Specification v1.0, http://osgug.ucaiug.org/sgsystems/OpenADR/Shared%20Documents/SRS/OpenSG%20OpenADR%201.0 %20SRS%20v1.0.pdf

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	83	
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	00	

- 1164 External Data Source: A source of data that does not originate with the electric utility
- 1165 **FERC**: The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. An independent agency that
- regulates the interstate transmission of natural gas, oil, and electricity. FERC also
- 1167 regulates natural gas and hydropower projects.¹
- FIPS: Federal Information Processing Standard. Publicly announced standards developedby the United States government.
- 1170 Firewall: A network device designed to block or allow packets based on a pre-
- 1171 determined set of rules.
- 1172 **Firmware**: Software embedded in a hardware device including in computer chips.
- 1173 **FMEA:** Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
- 1174 **FPKI:** Federal Public Key Infrastructure
- 1175 **FTP:** File Transfer Protocol

1176 **FTPS:** File Transfer Protocol over SSL. FTPS is an extension to the FTP protocol that

- adds application layer encryption via TLS and SSL. For "Secure FTP" or "SSH FileTransfer Protocol", please see SFTP.
- Gateway: A network management device that functions as the entry and exit point for a network segment.
- 1181 **GF:** General Failure
- 1182 GPS: Global Positioning System
- 1183 **GUID:** Globally Unique Identifier
- 1184 **HSM**: Hardware Security Module. An external physical type of secure crypto-processor
- 1185 targeted at managing digital keys, accelerating crypto-processes such as digital signings,
- and for providing strong authentication to access critical keys for server applications.
- 1187 HTTP: Hyper Text Transmission Protocol
- 1188 IDS: Intrusion Detection System. A passive monitoring system used to monitor network1189 and/or system activity for malicious activity or policy violations.
- 1190 **IEC**: International Electrotechnical Commission. A non-profit, non-governmental
- 1191 international standards organization that prepares and publishes International Standards
- 1192 for all electrical, electronic and related technologies collectively known as
- 1193 "electrotechnology."
- 1194 **IED**: Intelligent Electronic Device.
- 1195 IEEE: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers. An international non-profit,
- 1196 professional organization for the advancement of technology related to electricity.

¹² <u>http://www.ferc.gov/about/about.asp</u>

- 1197 Information Repository: Any location where the DM system stores data.
- 1198 IP: Internet Protocol. The primary protocol used for network communications in packetswitched networks. This protocol is specifically used for node addressing and packet
 routing.
- 1201 **IPS**: Intrusion Prevention System. An active monitoring system, similar to an IDS, used
- 1202 to monitor network and/or system activity for malicious activity or policy violations.
- 1203 Additionally, an IPS can terminate a connection upon detecting suspicious activity.
- **IPv4, IPv6**: IP (above) version 4 is the fourth revision of IP based on RFC 791. IPv4
 uses 32-bit addressing with a total of 4,294,967,296 (2³2) unique addresses. IPv6 is
 designed to supersede IPv4 and uses 128-bit addressing for a total of 2¹²⁸ unique
 addresses.
- 1208 IR: Interagency Report
- 1209 ISO: International Organization for Standardization
- 1210 ISO: Independent System Operator
- 1211 **IT**: Information Technology.
- 1212 ITIL: Information Technology Infrastructure Library
- 1213 LAN: Local Area Network. A network covering a small physical area.
- 1214 LIC: Logical Interface Category
- 1215 Link: is a step labeled with the name of some other use case. A link indicates that the1216 activity of this use case is followed by the activity of the linked use case.
- 1217 **Load**: Electric utility term for the infrastructure that uses the power the utility distributes
- -- such as homes, businesses, industry and in-the-field equipment -- thus, locating a
 power generation or storage device near load, for example, means putting it close to
- 1220 where the power will be used.
- Mesh network: A network technology where each node or end-device can communicate
 with any nearby devices to create "smart" data routing that finds the most efficient path
 for data and can change the path when a node stops working.
- 1224 MPLS: Multiprotocol Label Switching
- Multi-factor Authentication: Similar to two-factor authentication, using two or more
 independent methods, something you have (token or smart card), something you know
 (password or passcode), and something you are (biometric), for authentication.
- 1228 NDA: Non-Disclosure Agreement.
- 1229 NERC: North American Electric Reliability Corporation. A self-regulatory, non-
- 1230 government organization which has statutory responsibility to regulate bulk power

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	85
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	

- system users, owners, and operators through the adoption and enforcement of standards
 for fair, ethical and efficient practices.¹³
- Network Equipment: Equipment implementing any intermediary function specifically
 aimed at facilitating or brokering exchange of synchrophasor data between organizations
 is in scope.
- 1236 **Network Segment**: In networking, this is a network segment where all devices
- 1237 communicate using the same physical layer. Within WAMPAC, some switching devices
 1238 may be used to extend the segment which is defined by the role of the devices in that
 1239 segment.
- 1240 **NIST**: National Institute of Standards & Technology. An office of the US Dept of
- 1241 Commerce, it handles standards and technology issued for the federal government
- 1242 including being tasked in the Energy Independence & Security Act of 2007 with heading
- 1243 up an effort to set interoperability standards for the smart grid industry.(www.nist.gov)
- 1244 NOAA: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
- 1245 **Non-WAMPAC Application:** This is a utility operated application that does not rely 1246 critically on time-synchronized phasor measurements for its primary task.
- 1247 **NTP:** Network Time Protocol
- 1248 **Open SG**: Open Smart Grid users group part of the UCA International users group.¹⁴
- 1249 OMG UML: Object Management Group
- 1250 **Operations Center Equipment:** Equipment in the Operations or Control Center that 1251 internalizes and processes phasor data in the course of performing synchrophasor
- 1252 application functionality is in scope.
- 1253 **Optional flows:** An optional flow indicates a flow that may or may not always happen in1254 a use case.
- 1255 **OWASP:** Open Web Application Security Project
- 1256 Phasor Gateway: This is software that bridges one or more utility networks for the1257 purpose of exchanging phasor measurement data.
- 1258 **PKI:** Public Key Infrastructure
- Private Network: In networking this refers to networks using private IP space as defined
 by RFC 1918. Within electric power systems this refers to networks owned, operated or
 controlled by the utility or retail electric provider
- 1261 controlled by the utility or retail electric provider.
- 1262 **Public Network**: In networking this refers to networks using publicly-addressable IP
- space which can be routed via the Internet. Within electric power systems this refers to
- 1264 networks not owned, operated, or controlled by the utility or retail electric provider.

¹³ <u>http://www.nerc.com/page.php?cid=1</u>

¹⁴ <u>http://osgug.ucaiug.org/org/default.aspx</u>

- 1265 **QoS**: Quality of Service. In an IP network QoS provides guaranteed resource reservation
- to provide different priorities to different applications, users, or data flows, or toguarantee a certain level of performance to a data flow.
- Reference Architecture: Abstraction of solution architectures have been successfully
 used to address similar requirements.
- 1270 **RF**: Radio Frequency. Used as a generic term in many industries to describe radio 1271 signals used for networking and even those signals that cause interference.
- 1272 **RFC:** Request for Comments
- 1273 **RPN:** Risk Priority Number. A measurement used when assessing risk in the FMEA1274 process, which equals (Severity x Occurrence x Detection).
- 1275 **RFP**: Request for Proposal.
- 1276 **RTO:** Regional Transmission Organization
- 1277 **RTU**: Remote Terminal Unit. A unit that collects data from electrical devices, such as1278 meters, in real time.
- 1279 SAMATE: Software Assurance Metrics and Tool Evaluation
- SCADA: Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition. A system used by power utilities togather data from and issue commands to devices in the field.
- SCP: Secure Copy. SCP is an extension to the SSH protocol to implement a securereplacement for Remote Copy (RCP).
- 1284 SCL: Substation Configuration Language¹⁵
- 1285 SFTP: SSH File Transfer Protocol, also known as Secure FTP. STFP is an IETF
- extension to the Secure Shell (SSH) protocol to implement a secure replacement for FTP.
- 1287 For "FTP over SSL", please see FTPS.
- 1288 SG Security: Smart Grid Security working group within Open SG.
- 1289 SGIP: Smart Grid Interoperability Panel¹⁶
- Sensor: A sensor is a device that collects information such as voltage, temperature, ordevice status.
- 1292 Smart grid: The utility power distribution grid enabled with computer technology and
- 1293 two-way digital communications networking. The term encompasses the ever-widening
- 1294 palette of utility applications that enhance and automate the monitoring and control of
- 1295 electrical distribution networks for added reliability, efficiency and cost effective
- 1296 operations.

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR

UCA International Users Group

¹⁵ As defined in IEC 61850

¹⁶ <u>http://www.nist.gov/smartgrid/</u>

- 1297 **SOC**: Security Operations Center. Often incorporated with the network operations center,
- but designed to monitor security logging and security-related events.
- 1299 **Step:** indicates the activities performed by a role during a use case

1300 **Substation**: An electrical substation is a subsidiary station of an electricity generation,

1301 transmission and distribution system where voltage is transformed from high to low or

- 1302 the reverse using transformers. Electric power may flow through several substations
- between generating plant and consumer, and may be changed in voltage in several
 steps.¹⁷
- **TCP, TCP/IP**: Transmission Control Protocol. Usually written with internet protocol as
 TCP/IP and the two make up the suite of protocols that are used to communicate via the
 Internet.
- 1308 **TLS:** Transport Layer Security
- 1309 **TO:** Transmission Owner, as defined by NERC
- 1310 **TPM**: Trusted Platform Module. The name of a published specification detailing a secure

1311 crypto-processor that can store cryptographic keys that protect information, as well as the

1312 general name of implementations of that specification, often called the "TPM chip" or

- 1313 "TPM Security Device"
- 1314 **Two-Factor Authentication**: The act of using two independent authorization methods.
- Examples are mixing something you have (token or smart card), something you know (password or passcode), and something you are (biometric).
- 1317 UCAIug: UCA International Users Group. A not-for-profit corporation focused
- 1318 on assisting users and vendors in the deployment of standards for real-time applications
- 1319 for several industries with related requirements. The Users Group does not write
- 1320 standards, however works closely with those bodies that have primary responsibility for
- the completion of standards (notably IEC TC 57: Power Systems Management and
 Associated Information Exchange).¹⁸
- 1323 UML: Universal Modeling Language
- 1324 UPS: Universal Power Supply
- 1325 URL: Universal Resource Locator
- USB: Universal serial bus, a cable system with rectangular plugs used to connect a widevariety of devices to computers and computer peripherals.
- 1328 VLAN: Virtual Local Area Network. A method of segmenting and routing traffic
- between devices on an IP network so that they communicate as if they were attached to
- 1330 the same broadcast domain, regardless of their physical location.

¹⁷ <u>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electrical_substation</u>

¹⁸ <u>http://www.ucaiug.org/default.aspx</u>

- 1331 **VOIP**: Voice over Internet Protocol.
- 1332 VPN: Virtual Private Network. A VPN encapsulates data transfers between two or more
- 1333 networked devices not on the same private network so as to protect the transferred data
- 1334 from other devices on one or more intervening local or wide area networks.
- 1335 WAMPAC: Wide-Area Monitoring, Protection, and Control
- 1336 WAN: Wide Area Network. A computer network that covers a broad geographic area.
- 1337 WASA: Wide-area Situational Awareness
- 1338 WECC: Western Electricity Coordinating Council
- 1339 WiFi: Wireless Fidelity -- a standard for sending and receiving data -- such as in a home
- 1340 or small office network or LAN (or even an entire city). The standard includes a number
- 1341 of sub-standards under the IEEE's 802.11 standards.

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	89
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	05

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SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	91
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	•••

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SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	92
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	02

1421

Appendix F: OpenADR Cryptographic Security Profile

- 1422 The purpose of this document is to specify the cryptographic algorithms (security 1423 controls) for use with OpenADR 2.0. The set of controls includes:
- 1424 Hash
- Public Key
- Symmetric key
- Key exchange/key agreement
- 1428
- Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.2 is used to provide the secure transport for OpenADR.
 The cryptographic algorithms defined in Section 0 are to be used with TLS.

1431 **F.1** Method

- 1432 NISTIR 7628, Subsection 4.2 Cryptography and key management Solutions and Design
 1433 Considerations provides broad guidance on the use of cryptography within the smart
 1434 grid.
- 1435 This analysis looked at the specific data exchanged under OpenADR and considered the
- volume of data as well as requirements for confidentiality, availability, integrity and non-
- 1437 repudiation.

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	93	
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	011	

1438 1439 1440 1441	confor outsid	40-2 specifies requirements for validating cryptographic implementations for mance to the FIPS and SPs. The validation of the cryptographic implementations is e the scope of this document. Vendors who have validated cryptographic modules e found at http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/140-1/140val-all.htm
1442	The al	gorithms selection process considered
1443	•	Ensuring adequate security
1444	•	Minimizing overhead
1445	•	Promoting interoperability.
1446	F.2	References
1447 1448	•	IETF RFC 5246 - The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2, Aug 2008
1449	٠	NISTIR 7628, Guidelines for Smart Grid Cyber Security:
1450 1451		 Vol. 1, Smart Grid Cyber Security Strategy, Architecture, and High-Level Requirements,
1452		• Vol. 2, Privacy and the Smart Grid
1453		 Vol. 3, Supportive Analyses and References
1454 1455	•	NIST FIPS 180-3 Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)
1456	٠	NIST FIPS 186-3, Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)
1457	٠	NIST FIPS 197 - Advanced Encryption Standard
1458	٠	NIST SP 800-57, Recommendation for Key Management Part 1
1459 1460 1461	•	NIST SP 800-90, Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators (Revised).
1462 1463	•	NIST SP 800-22, A Statistical Test Suite for Random and Pseudorandom Number Generators for Cryptographic Applications
1464		
1465	•	NIST SP 800-107, Recommendation for Applications Using Approved Hash Algorithms
1466		
1467 1468 1469	•	NIST SP 800-131A, Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths, January 2011

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	94
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	•

1470 **F.3 Hash**

1471 Considerations

- The OpenADR data to be hashed has a relatively short lifetime (typically less than 60 days).
- The data has a moderate amount of structure to it making it more difficult for an attacker to create a meaningful collision.
- SHA-256 provides an estimated collision resistance of 128 bits which is consistent with the NIST recommended AES key length.

1478 **Recommendation**

- SHA-256 as specified in NIST FIPS 180-3 shall be used.
- The guidelines provided in NIST SP 800-107 are to be applied.

1481 F.4 Symmetric Encryption

1482 **Considerations**

1483 **Probable plaintext/ciphertext**

Much of the data pulled down from the website will be the same for multiple recipients.
Thus, an attacker could establish one legitimate account and observe a set of plaintext. It
is reasonable for the attacker to assume that other users accessing the web server will
initially receive similar data (e.g. the home page). This provides the attacker with
probable plaintext/ciphertext.

- 1489 This threat is offset by the fact that HTTPS (TLS) will establish a new key for each 1490 session. Thus, the lifetime of the key is limited. In addition, the value of data fades
- 1491 quickly with time. It is tactical, not strategic.

Volume

- 1493 Volume of data to be exchanged is relatively small compared to the amount of data that 1494 can safely be encrypted using modern block ciphers.
- 1495

1496 **Recommendation**

- AES 128 as specified in NIST FIPS 197 shall be used.
- The use of stream ciphers in the context of OpenADR is prohibited.
- 1499

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	95
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	55

1500 F.5 Public Key/Digital Signature

1501 Considerations

1502	After December 31, 2013, key lengths providing less than 112 bits of security strength
1503	shall not be used to generate digital signatures.

- 1504
- 1505 Keys used by certification authorities to sign certificates shall be longer than the keys 1506 used by servers in establishing secure sessions with clients.
- 1507
- 1508 The Transport Layer Security (TLS, RFC 5246) protocol will be used within the context1509 of OpenADR.
- 1510

1511 **Recommendations**

- 1512 For User Certificates containing elliptic curve public keys:
- 1513 Certification authorities signing server certificates: ECDSA-P384, SHA-384
- 1514 Operations other than certification authority certificate signing
- 1515 Key establishment ECDHE P-256
- Server authentication ECDSA P-256
- Signatures ECDSA P-256
- 1518
- 1519 For User Certificates containing RSA public keys:
- 1520 Certification authorities signing server certificates: RSA 3072
- 1521 Operations other than certification authority certificate signing
- Key establishment RSA 2048
- Server authentication RSA 2048
- Signatures RSA 2048
- 1525

1526 Cipher Suites

Some protocols (e.g., TLS) specify a suite of protocols to be used together. When TLS1.2 is used in the context of OpenADR the following one of the following cryptographic

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	96
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	•••

- suites shall be used. The selection of the specific Cipher Suite is at the discretion of the implementing organizations.

Suite	Message Authentication Code (MAC)	Pseudorandom Function (PRF)
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256	Galois Ctr.	P_SHA256
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256	Galois Ctr.	P_SHA256

SECURITY PROFILE FOR OPENADR	Version — 0.02	97
UCA International Users Group	December 15, 2011	01